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I study three questions related to competition and market design.In the first chapter, I study whether a 
peer-to-peer platform should set prices directly, or should it let sellers set prices while providing price 
recommendations. A platform can centralize prices and use exclusively available demand information, 
while price recommendations let sellers compete using their private information. On sharing economy 
platforms, for example, we observe a myriad of such pricing regimes. We investigate the implications of 
each pricing regime for the profits of platforms, buyers and sellers. When a platform recommends prices, 
it effectively plays the role of a sender in a multi-receiver cheap-talk game. In the second chapter, I study a 
particular instance of the trade-off between fairness and efficiency - a topic of increasing interest for 
marketers. After recreational cannabis legalization in 2012, Washington state policymakers had to choose 
whether to allocate retail licenses by lottery (a fair mechanism) or by auction (an efficient mechanism). 
They chose a lottery. Using transaction data from the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, I 
estimate an equilibrium model of competition in the recreational cannabis market and use it to simulate 
the counterfactual auction allocation of licenses. I find that an auction would have increased total sales 
by 5% and reduced prices by 3%. As a result, the state lost $137M over ten years in tax revenue, which 
amounts to 0.39% of the state's annual budget. From the perspective of fairness, I find that under an 
auction, Black applicants are on average 21% less likely to receive a retail license and majority-White 
areas of the state reap disproportionately larger consumer benets from the auction (20% increase vs 3% 
increase in consumer surplus for majority-Black and -Asian areas). In the third chapter, I document the 
effect vertical integration between broadcast television networks and major movie studios has on the 
studios' advertising strategies. I use a matching procedure together with a Difference-In-Differences 
estimator to separate the effect of vertical integration from the "content match". I find significant 
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ESSAYS IN QUANTITATIVE MARKETING
Vladimir Pavlov
Aviv Nevo
I study three questions related to competition and market design.
In the first chapter, I study whether a peer-to-peer platform should set prices directly,
or should it let sellers set prices while providing price recommendations. A platform can
centralize prices and use exclusively available demand information, while price recommen-
dations let sellers compete using their private information. On sharing economy platforms,
for example, we observe a myriad of such pricing regimes. We investigate the implications
of each pricing regime for the profits of platforms, buyers and sellers. When a platform
recommends prices, it effectively plays the role of a sender in a multi-receiver cheap-talk
game.
In the second chapter, I study a particular instance of the trade-off between fairness and
efficiency - a topic of increasing interest for marketers. After recreational cannabis legal-
ization in 2012, Washington state policymakers had to choose whether to allocate retail
licenses by lottery (a fair mechanism) or by auction (an efficient mechanism). They chose
a lottery. Using transaction data from the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board,
I estimate an equilibrium model of competition in the recreational cannabis market and
use it to simulate the counterfactual auction allocation of licenses. I find that an auction
would have increased total sales by 5% and reduced prices by 3%. As a result, the state
lost $137M over ten years in tax revenue, which amounts to 0.39% of the state’s annual
budget. From the perspective of fairness, I find that under an auction, Black applicants
are on average 21% less likely to receive a retail license and majority-White areas of the
state reap disproportionately larger consumer benefits from the auction (20% increase vs
iv
3% increase in consumer surplus for majority-Black and -Asian areas).
In the third chapter, I document the effect vertical integration between broadcast television
networks and major movie studios has on the studios’ advertising strategies. I use a match-
ing procedure together with a Difference-In-Differences estimator to separate the effect of
vertical integration from the “content match”. I find significant affiliation effect for ABC
and Walt Disney, and FOX and 20th Century, but not NBC and Universal.
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CHAPTER 1 : Price Manipulation in P2P Markets and Sharing Economy 1
1.1. Introduction
Platforms that operate peer-to-peer (P2P) markets can influence the interaction between
sellers and buyers through their platform design. Among many examples, Lyft and Uber
control pricing to facilitate rides between riders (buyers) and drivers (sellers), Airbnb con-
trols search results and recommends pricing to influence matching between hosts (sellers)
who rent their houses to guests (buyers), and LendingClub assigns a credit worthiness score
to borrowers (sellers) who are asking for a loan from investors (buyers).
Since the P2P structure is prevalent in many industries, it is not surprising that there is
no “one size fits all” market design of a P2P market. Platforms differ in many aspects
including how search results are presented to buyers, their fee structure, how much choice
buyers and sellers have and whether sellers can promote their offerings for an additional
fee. Many of these differences arise from the choices platforms make when using information
about consumer demand and seller competition to maximize their profits (if that is what
they are doing).
In many P2P markets, sellers often find it difficult to pick prices for their products because
of uncertainty about demand and competition. Equilibrium price levels, however, have a
dramatic impact on the profits of the platform. Higher prices will lead to less transactions
but with a higher margin, while low prices may increase the number of purchases but erode
profit. For example, when Airbnb initially launched their platform, sellers were setting
high prices that lowered the number of transactions, user satisfaction and platform revenue.
Consequently Airbnb introduced a price recommendation tool for hosts in 2013 which they
later improved in 2015 (Hill, 2015). Because sellers set their prices based on beliefs they
have about buyer demand, the platform can influence competition and price levels through
supplying information to sellers or through coordinating prices directly.
1Based on work with Ron Berman
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A second factor that impacts the long-term profitability of the platform is the quality of
matches achieved in realized transactions. Low-quality matches will lead to long-term churn
of buyers who switch to competing options. The platform can use its information about
buyer preferences and seller differentiation to influence the quality of matches offered to
buyers, alongside the prices achieved in these transactions. In this paper we analyze how
the information design of the platform can maximize its profits through manipulating the
realized price levels, levels of competition and match quality.
Researchers recently devoted substantial attention to analyzing selling mechanisms on P2P
platforms, with particular focus on using auctions vs. posted prices (Hammond, 2010, 2013;
Bauner, 2015; Einav et al., 2015, 2018; Waisman, 2017). Another stream of research looks
at dynamic pricing as a tool to influence the supply of sellers in the market (Guda and
Subramanian, 2019).
Less attention was given to which party sets the prices on the platform. While Lyft’s al-
gorithm sets the price for each ride (centralized pricing), Airbnb hosts and eBay sellers
are free to set their own prices (competitive pricing). However, even in competitive mar-
kets, platforms sometimes participate by providing a price recommendation to sellers/hosts.
Following its introduction of “price tips” in 2015, for example, Airbnb developed the rec-
ommendation tools further by introducing “smart pricing” in 2017, which lets the host set
the maximum and the minimum price of a stay and the platform adjusts the price of the
listing in response to predicted changes in demand.
When choosing whether to centralize pricing or let sellers compete, the platform has to
consider two key factors. First is the amount of demand information the platform possesses
relative to the information sellers have. In the case of Airbnb, for example, how good
is the pricing algorithm at predicting demand compared to the hosts themselves? If the
platform decides to centralize pricing, the prices will not reflect the private information
that sellers have. But if the platform chooses to let sellers compete without providing them
with information, the sellers cannot use demand-related data available to the platform to
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assist in their pricing decisions. Recommending prices may alleviate this trade-off partially;
it lets the platform share some of its information with the sellers, while giving the sellers
flexibility to compete. As we will show, these choices may alter the level of competition in
the market, influencing the equilibrium price levels and match quality. The second factor
the platform needs to consider is that in a competitive market sellers will set relatively
low prices, while centralized pricing allows the platform to extract more of the consumer
surplus. A possible solution to this tradeoff is to let sellers compete while providing them
with price recommendations that align with the platform’s goals. However, as we will
show, price recommendations constitute cheap talk by the platform, posing a challenge to
the usefulness of this strategy if the recommendations are not credible and ignored by the
sellers.
Our goal in this paper is to describe when a platform would prefer to centralize or decen-
tralize pricing and the implications of this decision for the platform, sellers and buyers.
Our results can help platform designers make informed decisions regarding pricing regimes
and information design. Because we also consider the effects of these choices on consumer
surplus, our results can also guide policymakers and regulators considering the regulation
and impact of P2P markets.
To study these questions, we construct a theoretical model of segmented competition be-
tween two differentiated sellers who sell imperfect substitutes on a platform to buyers.
Buyers choose whether to buy a product in the market or pick an outside option. The
platform can design a search technology that limits the buyers ability to buying from only
one seller, or two. The platform also chooses whether to set prices for the sellers or to
let the sellers compete with or without a price recommendation. If the sellers are allowed
to compete, they can set prices for their product while taking the recommendation of the
platform into account.
There are two sources of uncertainty in our model. First, each seller has private information
about the quality of her product, which affects the utility buyers receive from the product.
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Second, there is an aggregate market-level shock to willingness to pay (e.g., how many
visitors to a certain city are budget-conscious tourists and how many are business travelers
with expense accounts). This shock is observed by the platform, but not by the sellers.
Like most real-life platforms, we assume that the platform receives a fixed-percentage fee
of the sellers’ revenues. This means that while the platform wants to maximize the joint
revenue of the sellers, each seller seeks to maximize their own profit and does not internalize
the sales they take away from their competitor by lowering their price. Because of this
misalignment of incentives between the sellers and the platform, the sellers will not follow a
price recommendation by the platform blindly. The sellers will form rational expectations
of the platform’s strategy, i.e., in which state of the world the platform will choose to
recommend each price. This messaging game where the platform recommends prices and the
sellers have misaligned incentives is an instance of classic cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel,
1982). However, unlike Crawford and Sobel (1982) and most of the cheap talk literature,
our model has multiple receivers (sellers) that interact with each other (i.e., compete) and
the outcome of this interaction determines the payoff of the sender. In a standard cheap
talk game, the misalignment in incentives between the sender and the receiver is exogenous,
while in our model it is endogenous and stems from the difference in market power between
the platform and the sellers, as well as the level of competition among the sellers. Both of
these are influenced by the price recommendations of the platform.
We find that the platform should choose to centralize pricing if there is little uncertainty
about the quality of sellers’ products. On the other hand, if this uncertainty is large
and the variance of the aggregate demand shock observed by the platform is large, the
platform should recommend a price. If the variance of the aggregate shock is small, price
recommendations cannot be credible in equilibrium and the platform should let the sellers
set their own prices. The intuition is that the agents that posses the more valuable demand
information should set the prices that reflect that information.
To provide an example of such a setting, consider an Airbnb market in a particular city. The
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willingness to pay of buyers depends on how many business travelers are looking to book in
this market, which the platform can observe. The private information each seller (host) has
is the (unobserved by the platform) quality of apartment offered. For example the quality
of the view or location is often hard for platforms to assess. If both sources of uncertainty
are small, e.g., it is either a place where people only come for business that has no good
views at all or a place where all views are great and that attracts primarily tourists, the
platform should centralize pricing to leverage its position as a monopolist. If both sources
of uncertainty are large, e.g., there are different kinds of travelers in this market and some
apartments can have extremely nice views while others are facing a brick wall, the platform
should recommend a price and allow sellers to use both sources of information for pricing.
When we focus on the benefit of pricing regimes for sellers, we find a few surprising results.
High quality sellers surprisingly exhibit a stronger preference for centralized pricing, while
low quality sellers have a stronger preference for recommendation and competition. These
differences stem from how competition affects the levels of demand and prices when a high
quality seller faces a low quality seller.
We also find that buyer surplus is almost always maximized under competitive pricing by
the sellers. Unlike sellers, buyers do not benefit when prices adjust with the state of the
demand. If the price is too high, buyers can always take an outside option with a limited
downside. But if the price is low when demand is high, they will enjoy a large surplus.
Therefore, buyers are better off when prices respond the least to changing demand. In most
cases, this happens under competitive pricing, as the sellers only take into account the
information about their own quality. Price recommendations always hurt buyers compared
to the fully competitive case, as it increases price variance without lowering the average
price. Under centralized pricing, the average price is higher, but in extreme cases when the
variance of the aggregate shock is small (all visitors are tourists), but the range of possible
qualities is large (the views are superb or terrible), then the buyers prefer centralized pricing.
One emerging result from our analysis shows that platforms are generally better off (in
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terms of profit) with centralized pricing and search technology that gives customers many
options to choose from. However, if platforms also want to take their growth into account,
price recommendations provide a better avenue to achieve both growth and profit, because
centralized pricing excludes consumers from the market. A second emerging result is that
unlike much of the previous research, we find that centralizing prices through a platform is
not always profit maximizing for both the platforms and sellers. Moreover, there are cases
where price recommendations from a platform may not be credible, and the platform might
be better off not offering them at all.
Following a review of the literature, we present our game theoretic model. We then follow
with an analysis of a benchmark case with a platform that can choose between centralized
pricing and competition. This analysis serves as a stepping stone to analyze the cheap-
talk game where platforms recommend prices. We conclude with an analysis of the market
implications for different stakeholders. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.1.
1.2. Contribution to Literature
Our work contributes to three streams of literature. First, our paper adds to the growing lit-
erature on P2P platforms (see, e.g., Narasimhan et al. (2018) and Eckhardt et al. (2019) for
surveys on related research in marketing). The substantial research on platform design and
impact (e.g. Einav et al., 2016; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2016; Jiang and Tian, 2016; Zervas
et al., 2017; Ke et al., 2017; Fradkin, 2017; Fradkin et al., 2018; Guda and Subramanian,
2019) has focused on measuring the impact of collaborative consumption on the market, as
well as explored how different features of platform design affect market outcomes. Within
this literature, the research on platform pricing has mostly considered auctions vs. posted
prices, or the impact of dynamic pricing on matching buyers and sellers. Auctions, how-
ever, are not a natural choice for many platforms, while dynamic pricing requires exerting
pricing controls and having dynamic information that many platforms might not possess.
For this reason we focus on two common general mechanisms - centralized pricing where
the platform sets pricing for all sellers vs. competitive pricing where the platform allows
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sellers to set their own prices, with or without a price recommendation.
Second, we add to the theoretical work on strategic communication (Milgrom, 1981, 2008;
Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Sobel, 2013), which has recently been applied in marketing
contexts on persuasive communication (Gardete, 2013; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2014).
Interestingly, cheap talk has rarely been applied to the analysis of a market with many
competing receivers. The work of Kim and Kircher (2015), for example, has many senders
who send cheap-talk messages, while our work looks at a sender trying to coordinate a
market using cheap talk. We prove that the results of Crawford and Sobel (1982) are
robust to introducing competition in our model: we find that all possible equilibria have
“coarse” communication, i.e., the platform recommends a range of prices instead of a single
price and the platform (the sender) and the sellers (receivers) benefit when more fine-grained
communication is possible.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on oligopolistic competition under uncertainty
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1986, 1989; Gardete, 2016). While in these works the level of
competition is determined by exogenous uncertainty competitors face, our research extends
these works to a scenario in which a market designer can control the level of uncertainty
facing competitors and thus influence the level of the competition to her benefit using cheap
talk.
1.3. Model and Pricing Benchmark
There are three types of players who interact in a one-shot game: buyers, sellers and a
platform. The mass of 2M buyers are distributed uniformly on the real line in the range
[−M,M ] where M is large. The buyers visit a P2P platform to buy a product from one of
two potential sellers. Seller 1 is positioned at −1 and seller 2 is positioned at 1.2 A buyer
located at x ∈ [−M,M ] has demand for up to one product. If they choose to buy a product
2The symmetry around 0 simplifies the exposition vs. a standard Hotelling model with locations 0 and 1.
7
from seller i, their utility is:
ui(x) = v + qi − pi − di(x) (1.1)
Where pi is the price of product i, di(x) is the distance between the seller and buyer and qi
is the quality of the product which equals −q or q with q > 0. Because sellers 1 and 2 are
located at 1 and −1 respectively, the distances equal d1(x) = |x+ 1| and d2(x) = |x− 1|.
The buyer’s willingness to pay v is drawn from an a-priori uniform distribution U [v, v] with
v > 0. We assume that the platform has more information about the realization of v than
the sellers. If buyers are business travelers, for example, their willingness to pay might be
higher than budget conscious tourists. A platform will be able to observe if searches for
listings in a specific city, for example, come mostly from business travelers. Buyers will also
know their realization of v before buying the product. Sellers, in contrast, are not exposed
to the search process on the platform, and hence will have less information about v. For
simplicity, we assume that the platform observes the realization of v and the sellers do not.
The value of qi is private information of each seller. It is drawn independently with equal a-
priori probability of being q or −q. We assume that buyers can observe qi before purchasing
the product, but the platform cannot. Although we abstract away from the details of such
a setup, this is consistent with a signaling game where buyers can learn the quality from
observed prices before making their purchase decisions, but the platform cannot learn these
qualities before making its own decisions. Appendix A.2 provides a detailed signaling model
in which prices signal quality in equilibrium under competition, but not under centralized
pricing.
Finally, we assume that the outside option is the same for all buyers and is normalized to 0.
The outside option can capture the utility from going to a competitor (taxi, public transit
or Uber instead of Lyft) or from not making any purchase.
Before visiting the platform, buyers are not aware of the sellers and hence cannot buy from
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them. Once consumers visit the platform, buyers use search tools to find their preferred
product. We assume a simple search technology: a share α < 1/2 of buyers discover seller
1 only, another group of size α discover seller 2 only, and the remaining mass of 1 − 2α
buyers discovers both sellers. We call the first two groups “captives” as they can only
buy from one seller or pick the outside option. We call the buyers who are aware of both
sellers “comparison shoppers” (or shoppers). Once consumers visit the platform, they see
the prices, distances and qualities of each seller say are aware of. The consumers pick the
option that gives them the highest utility among the sellers or the outside option. Initially,
we assume that α is exogenous. Later, we compare the choices of different values of α in
Section 1.6.
The platform receives a fixed share φ of the sellers’ revenues that is set exogenously. This
revenue-sharing arrangement mimics many of the contracts in the P2P universe. Hence
seller i’s expected profit is:
πi = Ev[(1− φ)piDi(p1, p2)] (1.2)
while the platform’s expected payoff is:
πP = Eq1,q2 [φ(p1D1(p1, p2) + p2D2(p1, p2))] (1.3)
where Di(p1, p2) is the realized demand, which is equal the total mass of consumers buying
from seller i.
From the profit functions it is evident that the sellers and the platform have misaligned
incentives. The platform would like to maximize the joint revenue of the sellers, while
each seller would like to maximize its own profit. Moreover, the competition might affect
the pricing incentives of the sellers, while the platform does not care which seller sells the
product as long as a transaction is made. Hence the incentives of the platform and the
sellers are not perfectly aligned with respect to setting prices.
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A second factor that affects the profit of the sellers and the platform is information asym-
metry. If the platform sets the prices, it cannot use the information that the sellers have
about qi. If the sellers set prices, they are uncertain about the willingness to pay v unless
they receive information from the platform.
Our main goal is to analyze the usage of price recommendations by the platform to profitably
manipulate the equilibrium profits, price levels and matching quality in the market. To
achieve this goal, we initially analyze two benchmark pricing strategies to gain insights
about the model and serve as a stepping stone for the analysis of the price recommendation
strategy. We will analyze the equilibria of the following three cases in terms of platform
and seller profits, consumer surplus, and quality of matching:
1. Centralized Pricing (CP) - The platform sets prices for both sellers.
2. Competition (C) - The platform lets the sellers set their own prices without providing
them information.
3. Recommendation (R) - The platform recommends a non-binding price to the sellers,
and each seller sets their own price.
As we discuss in detail later, any recommendation message the platform sends to sellers
is effectively a signal about the value of v, because v is the only payoff-relevant private
information that the platform has. In other words, all price recommendations that the
platform can provide in our model are functions of v and are therefore isomorphic to a
“direct” message communicating the value of v.
The three cases above cover the full range of actions the platform can take to influence the
sellers in our model. To finalize the model, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. The platform selects a pricing and recommendation strategy.
2. Nature draws v (observed by the platform and buyers), q1 (observed by seller 1) and
q2 (observed by seller 2).
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3. The platform gives a price recommendation to the sellers if it decided to do so.
4. Prices are set by the platform or by the sellers.
5. Buyers visit the platform. They learn di, pi and qi for one or two sellers.
6. Buyers make their purchase decisions and payoffs are realized.
At step 3, if the platform elects to not recommend a price, we can assume that it is giving
an uninformative recommendation (e.g., recommends a random price independent of the
state of the world v or the same price in every state of the world).
1.3.1. Centralized Pricing vs. Competition
To analyze the benchmark cases of centralized pricing and competitive pricing, we first
derive the demand experienced by each seller when the prices are p1 and p2.
For captive consumers, each buyer chooses between seller i and the outside option. There
are two buyers who are indifferent between buying and not buying, equidistant to the left
and to the right of −1 (seller 1) or 1 (seller 2). The demand from captives is then the mass
of buyers between these two points:
Dcapi (pi) = 2(v + qi − pi) (1.4)
To find the demand from comparison shoppers, we first make an assumption that facilitates
tractability of the analysis:
Assumption A1. (i) v > 2q + 3− 2α and (ii) q < 1.
The first part of Assumption A1 is a standard full coverage assumption for shoppers in the
[−1, 1] interval, and makes sure these shoppers buy from either firm 1 or 2. The second
part implies that the difference in quality between sellers is not so high that comparison
shoppers always buy only from one seller. Effectively, it guarantees that if the prices set by
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the sellers are equal, each seller will receive some demand from comparison shoppers even if
qualities are different. Relaxing these assumptions will not change the results qualitatively,
but will make the analysis less tractable.
Using assumption A1, the demand of shoppers is:
Dsi (pi, p−i) =
qi − q−i − pi + p−i
2
+ v + 1 + qi − pi (1.5)
Combining the demands from both segments the total demand for seller i can be written
to yield a linear and differentiated Bertrand model (Klemperer and Meyer, 1986, 1989):
Di(pi, p−i) =








The differentiation in the model stems from the difference in price sensitivities of consumers
buying from a specific firm. Because each firm’s own price influences also the captive
segment, the demand each firm sees is more elastic with respect to changes in its own price
compared to changes in the competitor’s price.
Solving for the profit-maximizing price results in the following:
Proposition 1. When using centralized pricing:
• The unique profit-maximizing price is: p∗1 = p∗2 = p∗(v) = v+1−2α2 .
The optimal centralized price increases with v, but decreases with α.
• The maximum centralized profit is: πCPP = φ
(v+1−2α)2
2 .
The optimal centralized profit increases in v and decreases with α.
• The maximum expected centralized profit is:
E(πCPP ) = φ
(v̄ + 1− 2α)3 − (v + 1− 2α)3
6(v̄ − v)
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The expected centralized profit increases in v̄ and v, and decreases with α.
• The ex ante expected profit of high and low type sellers is:





q(3− 2α)(v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α))
8
)




− q(3− 2α)(v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α))
8
)
Proposition 1 shows that prices and profits increase, as expected, with the average willing-
ness to pay v. A surprising result is that the profit decreases with α, as intuition might
suggest that the platform could gain the most by exposing each buyer to only one product,
and use monopoly pricing for each product. This intuition breaks when the platform has
uncertainty over qi. When the sellers differ in quality, if most buyers are captives (high α),
those aware of the low quality seller will only buy if the price is low. The platform, however,
is constrained to setting the same price for both products. If these buyers are made aware
about the other seller, however, they may be willing to make a purchase at a higher price
from a high quality seller. Hence, it is in the interest of the platform to make more buyers
informed and decrease α.
Turning the attention of analysis to competition, seller i with type τ will set a price piτ to
maximize their expected profit. We look for a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, and
hence can denote the equilibrium strategy of sellers as pCτ for type τ ∈ {H,L} and drop the







(1− φ)pτEv(Dτ (pτ , pCH) +Dτ (pτ , pCL ))) (1.7)
where Dτ denotes the demand of a seller with type τ .
Solving for the equilibrium results in the following:
Proposition 2. Under price competition between the sellers:
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2E(v) + 2(1− 2α)
(5− 2α)
(1.9)
The price pCH increases with q and p
C
L decreases with q. Both prices increase in α if
v + v > 8 and decrease in α otherwise.





16(E(v) + 1− 2α)
(
2E(v)− (5− 2α)v − 3 + 8α− 4α2
)
4(5− 2α)2
• The platform’s ex ante profits are:
E(πCP ) =
φ(3− 2α)(4(v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α))2 + q2(5− 2α)2)
4(5− 2α)2
• The sellers’ ex ante profits are:
E(πCH) =
(1− φ)(3− 2α)(2(v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α)) + (5− 2α)q)2
8(5− 2α)2
E(πCL ) =
(1− φ)(3− 2α)(2(v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α))− (5− 2α)q)2
8(5− 2α)2
Proposition 2 shows that prices are linear in the beliefs of the sellers about the expectation of
v. When we analyze price recommendation using cheap talk in the next section, this feature
will come into play as the platform will want to influence the resulting equilibrium prices
through influencing the beliefs of sellers. Specifically, the platform’s profit is quadratic in
the beliefs of the sellers, first increasing and then decreasing.
When we compare the equilibrium prices and profits between centralized pricing and com-
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petition, we find the following:
Corollary 1.
• The prices pCL and pCH are higher than the centralized price when v is high enough and
v is low enough.







(1− 2α)2 − 2(v̄ + v)
5− 2α
)
• There is a q̃ such that the platform makes a higher ex-ante profit without a price
recommendation compared to centralized pricing if and only if q > q̃.
• There is a q̃H (q̃L) such that a high (low) quality seller makes a higher ex-ante profit
without a price recommendation compared to centralized pricing if and only if q > q̃H
(q > q̃L).
Corollary 1 has two interesting findings. First, prices under competition may be higher
than prices set by a centralized planner. When v is high, and the realization of v is low,
sellers will set too high prices because they expect higher demand than what is realized,
and as a result will lower the platform’s profit. If the platform could affect the beliefs of
sellers about v, it might be able to better influence this competition to its benefit.
The second interesting finding is that in scenarios where q is high, and there is substantial
uncertainty about the difference in seller quality, it is more beneficial for the platform to
let sellers compete than to set prices for them. This is in contrast to the previous literature
that found that coordinating centralized prices is beneficial for a platform as it softens
competition among sellers and increases sale prices. In a world where there is sufficient
uncertainty about the quality of sellers on a platform, the platform should relinquish the
pricing power to the players that hold the most uncertain information.
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Having established the considerations for picking among the two basic pricing models, in
the next section we turn to analyze price recommendations. These recommendations allow
the platform to influence the beliefs of sellers about v, and thus manipulate the benefits of
competition for the platform.
1.4. Price Manipulation with Cheap Talk
When sellers set their own prices they integrate over their beliefs about v to maximize their
expected profits (Equation (1.6)). The platform can try to influence the sellers’ decision
by providing them with a price recommendation that the sellers will incorporate into their
decisions. Providing a price recommendation and providing information about the value
of v are equivalent because setting prices is the only action sellers can take, and v is the
only missing piece of information sellers need from the platform. If the platform chooses to
provide (possibly inaccurate) information about v, the sellers can back-out the real value
of v consistent with an equilibrium strategy of the platform, and make a pricing decision.
Similarly, if the platform provides a price recommendation (and not a direct message about
the value of v), the sellers will infer the values of v which are consistent (in equilibrium)
with the platform’s recommendation.
We therefore assume that the platform’s strategy is a (possibly non-deterministic) mapping
from the interval of possible realizations of v ∈ [v, v] to a message space on the same interval.
In other words, the platform observes the realization of v and reports to the sellers some
plausible value m(v) ∈ [v, v], which may or may not coincide with the actual realization.
An important feature of the model is that the message m(v) is costless for the platform
(the Sender) to send, and that the platform’s incentives are misaligned with the sellers (the
Receivers). Sellers have an incentive to lower prices to respond to competition and maximize
their own profits, while the platform would like sellers to maximize their joint profit, which
often means increasing their prices from a competitive level. This is an instance of a cheap-
talk game (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), but unlike the extant cheap-talk literature, our
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model features multiple receivers who interact strategically with each other. Our analysis
also tries to answer whether cheap talk can be both a credible and a profitable equilibrium
strategy with competing receivers.
A second interesting insight is that a “babbling equilibrium”, which always exists in cheap
talk games, coincides in our model with the competition scenario we analyzed in the previous
section. In such an equilibrium, the message sent by the platform is uninformative, i.e., it is
statistically independent from the realization of v. Examples of such strategies would be to
always recommend the same price, or to report a random value of v to sellers. The sellers
will then ignore the message and rely on their prior beliefs over v when setting prices.
To understand what actions the platform should take, we first analyze the response of sellers
to a message m in the pricing subgame. When receiving a recommendation m, sellers will
update their beliefs (using Bayesian updating) about the distribution of v. When updating
their beliefs sellers will take into account the equilibrium strategy m(v) used by the platform
to narrow the possible values of v to those consistent with the message m. The resulting
equilibrium prices depend only on the updated expected value of v, E(v|m) as shown in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Given a platform’s messaging strategy m(v) and after receiving a message m,




















When we compare to the results of proposition 2, it is notable that the recommendation of
the platform affects the prices through the expectation linearly, and that if both types of
sellers believe the expected value of v is higher, they will set higher prices.
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Because the platform influences the decision of the sellers by communicating a value for v,
we can calculate the profit of the platform as a function of the true state v and the seller’s





16(E(v|m) + 1− 2α)
(
2E(v|m)− (5− 2α)v − 3 + 8α− 4α2)
)
4(5− 2α)2
πR(v,m) is quadratic in E(v|m) and linear in v. Consequently every state v has a value
E∗(v) that maximizes the payoff of the platform:
E∗(v) =
v(5− 2α) + (1− 2α)2
4
(1.12)
This expectation does not equal to v itself and is in fact always larger than v, hence the
platform would like to inflate the sellers’ expectations of v through the recommendation.
However, as sellers are rational and anticipate this strategy of the platform, that is impos-
sible.
Given this limitation, we show in the next Lemma (based on Lemma 1 of Crawford and
Sobel (1982)) that only a finite set of of beliefs can be induced in equilibrium, which implies
that the true value of v cannot be communicated, and only an indication of ranges of values
of v can be sent as a message:
Lemma 2. If for every message m the values v 6= E∗(v|m), then there exists an ε > 0,
such that for any two equilibrium messages m1 and m2 that induce different beliefs E(v|m1)
and E(v|m2), the difference is at least ε, i.e., |E(v|m1) − E(v|m2)| > ε. Moreover, the set
of expectations that can be induced in equilibrium is finite.
Lemma 2 shows that whenever two messages induce different equilibrium beliefs, those
beliefs will have at least some minimal distance between them. In order words, the platform
cannot induce a continuous set of beliefs and will have “jumps” between them. The intuition
behind this result is that because the platform’s incentives and the seller incentives differ,
the platform will want to deviate from revealing the value of v and send a message that
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induces an expectation closer to E∗(v). To induce these higher beliefs, the platform needs
a large enough jump from the true value. Because the message space is bounded and
because there are jumps between beliefs, this means that there is a finite number of induced
expectation values possible in equilibrium. The consequence of Lemma 2 is that the true
value of v cannot be communicated in equilibrium, i.e., there cannot be full revelation of v
in equilibrium.
Given that there is no full revelation, we construct an equilibrium in which the state space
is partitioned into n subintervals [v, v1], [v1, v2], ..., [vn−1, v] and the platform reveals to
the sellers in which interval the realization of v lies. Suppose that the realized state is
v ∈ [vk, vk+1]. Let mk denote the message sent by communicating a random value drawn
from U [vk, vk+1]. Hence, the message mk can be any value from the interval it represents,
which rules out possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs.3
Using Lemma 1, the equilibrium belief that determines the prices will be E(v|mk) = vk−1+vk2 .
To find the boundaries vk between the subintervals of the message space, we notice that if
the true value is v = vk, the platform should be indifferent between sending the messages
mk−1 and mk. We can write this indifference condition as:
πR(vk,mk−1) = π
R(vk,mk), k = 1, . . . , n− 1 (1.13)
which can be rewritten as the following difference equation:
vk =
vk+1 + vk−1 − (1− 2α)2
3− 2α
(1.14)
with boundary conditions v0 = v and vn = v̄.
3It is sufficient to focus on uniform distributions for the mixing strategies within intervals because for
any other set of mixing distributions, the outcomes will be equal.
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(3− 2α)2 − 4
2
C1 =
v̄ − v∗ − λn2 (v − v∗)
λn1 − λn2
C2 =
λn1 (v − v∗)− (v̄ − v∗)
λn1 − λn2
This unique solution determines the interval boundaries vk for messages sent by the platform
to reveal information about the value v and recommend a price.
Once we know how to find the boundaries that determine messages, a second value that
determines the equilibrium is the number of intervals n. How large can n be? As n becomes
larger, we approach full revelation, which was ruled out by Lemma 2. The fact that vk+1




(λ1 − λ2) > λn1 (1− λ2) + λn2 (λ1 − 1) (1.16)
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When there is a natural number n∗ > 1 such that condition (1.16) holds,
then there is a price recommendation equilibrium. In this equilibrium [v, v] is divided into
n∗ subintervals [v, v1], [v1, v2], ..., [vn∗−1, v̄], where vk is defined by equation (1.15). When
v ∈ [vk−1, vk], the platform draws a value from U [vk−1, vk] and sends that value as a message
to the sellers.
In the price recommendation equilibrium:
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vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α)
(5− 2α)
(1.17)




vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α)
(5− 2α)
(1.18)
• The ex ante expected equilibrium profits are:





(3− 2α)(4(vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α))2 + q2(5− 2α)2)
4(5− 2α)2
(1.19)





(3− 2α)(2(vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α)) + (5− 2α)q)2
8(5− 2α)2
(1.20)





(3− 2α)(2(vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α))− (5− 2α)q)2
8(5− 2α)2
(1.21)
• When n∗ ≥ 2, the platform and the sellers prefer price recommendation to no recom-
mendation (competition). There exists a q̂, such that the platform is better off under
price recommendation compared to centralized pricing if and only if q > q̂. There also
exists q̂H (q̂L) such that a high (low) type seller is better off under recommendation
than under centralized pricing if and only if q > q̂H (q > q̂L).
Proposition 3, which is a major result of the paper, shows that whenever there is a natural
number larger than 1 for which the inequality in (1.16) holds, it is more profitable for the
platform to give recommendations in equilibrium compared to letting sellers compete with-
out a recommendation. Moreover, when the uncertainty q is high enough, recommendations
are more profitable to the platform (and the sellers) compared to centralized pricing. The
intuition is that as n increases, the profit of the platform also increases, which makes rec-
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ommendations preferable. When q is high enough, similarly to the competition case, profits
might also increase above the centralized pricing case.
Along with the bubbling (competition) equilibrium, when n∗ ≥ 3 there are multiple price
recommendation equilibria. These equilibria differ by how coarse the partition of values of
v is. Theorems 3 and 5 of Crawford and Sobel (1982) establish that in a cheap talk game,
both the sender and receiver are ex ante better off in an equilibrium with a larger n. Since
the conditions of these theorems hold in our model, the profit of the platform and the sellers
increases with n∗.
To understand which one of the multiple cheap-talk equilibria might be reasonably played,
we apply the no incentive to separate (NITS) criterion of Chen et al. (2008). NITS states
that a sender with the lowest type (i.e., a platform that observes v = v) always prefers
the cheap-talk equilibrium payoffs than having the receiver (i.e., the sellers) observe the
sender’s true type (i.e., the sellers knowing that v = v). Using this criterion, we can prove
the following:
Corollary 2. The unique equilibrium that satisfies NITS is the equilibrium with the most
refined partition, i.e., with n∗ intervals. Consequently, the platform will provide price rec-
ommendations rather than choose competition when cheap talk is possible.
To summarize, we have found conditions under which a platforms might prefer to let con-
sumers compete with or without price recommendations. These cases are applicable when
the uncertainty in the market about seller quality is high enough. An interesting additional
finding is that price recommendations are not always beneficial. In many cases they are not
credible and will be ignored by the sellers.
After establishing the conditions for which a platform would prefer to provide price recom-
mendations, we deepen the analysis in the following section to understand the impact on
sellers, buyers and the market.
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1.5. Market Implications
In this section we compare the benefits for sellers and consumers, as well as the equilibrium
demand in the different pricing regimes. We start with illustrating the regions of parameters
for which the platform or the sellers are better off in the different pricing regimes. Because
the inequalities for these conditions have higher order polynomials, we are only able to
provide numerical analyses.
Figure 1 shows the regimes in which each player achieves maximum profit, as a function of
q and v when α=0.45 and v = 5. We can see a common pattern emerge: when v is high
and q is low, all players prefer centralized pricing (top left); when v is low and q is high, all
players prefer competition (bottom right); when both q and v are large, recommendation
leaves all players better off. The intuition is that v captures the amount of information the
platform has while q captures the amount of information the sellers have. If v is small, i.e.,
close to v, there is little variation in the aggregate demand level and demand is consistent.
Consequently there is little value to the platform’s information. Because, in addition, low
values of v cannot sustain the recommendation equilibrium, all players are better off if the
sellers are allowed to price based on the information they posses. In contrast, if v is high
and q is low, there is little value to the sellers’ private information and the platform can
safely ignore it and centralize pricing. Finally, if both sources of uncertainty are relatively
strong, the platform should recommend a price, so that the sellers can combine their private
information with the platform’s information.
A surprising feature to observe include the differences among the three figures. High type
sellers prefer centralized pricing more strongly than low types and even more than the
platform. This result is formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For q̃H , q̃L and q̃ as defined in Proposition 2, and q̂H , q̂L and q̂ as defined
in Proposition 3:
• q̃H > q̃ > q̃L
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Figure 1: Pricing regimes that the platform and the sellers prefer depending on the values
of q and v̄. Other parameters: α = 0.45,.
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• q̂H > q̂ > q̂L
The proposition shows the counter-intuitive result that high types prefer to relinquish pric-
ing control to the platform, although they have pricing power in competition against low
types. The intuition is that when pricing is centralized, prices are equal across types. If one
of the sellers is a high type and the other is low, the high type will obtain a large market
share and a substantially larger profit than the low type. When the pricing is decentralized,
the high type’s advantage is mitigated by the fact that the low type can lower their price
to attract more buyers. Centralized pricing can be exploited by the high type to soften
competition from price cutters. If one considers the dynamics of pricing on platforms, this
implies that the more platforms centralize pricing, the more we might see higher quality
players on the platform.
Next, we consider the expected total size of the market, i.e., the expected mass of buyers
served in equilibrium. Total demand is equal to
TD(p1, p2) = 2(1− 2α) + 2v + q1 + q2 − p1 − p2
Using symmetry and integrating over q and v, the expected total demand is:
E(TD(p1, p2)) = 2(1− 2α) + v̄ + v − 2E(p)
Using the fact that the expected total market coverage turns out to depend only on expected
prices, we can prove the following result:
Proposition 5.
• E(TDR) = E(TDC) > E(TDCP ).
• The expected distance between a buyer and the seller they purchase from is E(TD4 ).
Proposition 5 shows that total demand is higher when sellers compete on prices. It does not
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change if recommendations are feasible or not. This is because the only differences between
prices under recommendation and competition is that under recommendation the expecta-
tion over v is conditional on the message from the platform. As the sellers have rational
expectations and the prices are linear in those expectations, summing over all possible mes-
sages and weighting by the message probability yields the same ex ante expectation and
hence the same expected price. Under centralized pricing, the prices are higher on average,
as the platform internalizes the substitution patterns between the two sellers and therefore
faces less elastic overall demand than each seller individually.
One of the important implications of proposition 5 is that when cheap talk (or competition)
are more profitable to a platform than centralized pricing, the effect is not coupled with
decreased demand, but rather with an increase in market size. As we discuss later, for
many young platforms, growth often comes at the expense of profits, but as our results
show, these two goals do not necessarily contradict.
Now we consider the consumer surplus (expected utility) of buyers, which we illustrate in
Figure 2. Because buyers have an outside option, they are shielded from some of the risk
of experiencing a low realization of v or receiving −q. In other words, the downside of
participating in the market is limited, similar to a financial “call” option. In this case, from
an ex ante perspective, buyers prefer a payoff that varies more, as they can capture more
of the upside. The more prices reflect the realizations of v and q, the less variation there
is in the buyers’ payoff. Therefore, buyers prefer those pricing regimes that attenuate the
uncertainty the most when translating from realizations of v and quality to prices. Buyers
always prefer no recommendation to recommendation, since then prices do not vary with
v. They also prefer centralized pricing when v is small and therefore v matters little, while
q is large.
The intuition is formalized in the following result:
Proposition 6. When comparing the consumer surplus of buyers under the three pricing
regimes:
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Figure 2: Pricing regimes that the buyers prefer depending on the values of q and v̄ when
α = 0.45 and
• CSC > CSR.
• There exists a q′ such that CSCP > CSC if and only if q > q′.
The first item of Proposition 6 emphasizes the contradicting preferences of the platform and
the sellers with those of buyers. Similarly, buyers prefer centralized pricing only when q is
large, which is exactly when the platform and the sellers prefer competition. This result
underscores the potential trade-offs between the two sides of the market that platform
designers have to consider.
1.6. Impact of Search Technology α
An interesting feature of our model is the search technology α that determines what share
of consumers see more or less options when visiting the platform. If the platform could
influence α by designing a different search algorithm, what would be the platform’s preferred
choice?
Performing a complete analysis of how α impacts the equilibria results is non-tractable
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because of the complexity of the model. To further the analysis, we therefore use numerical
analysis as well as compare the cases of α = 0 and α = 1/2.
Figure 3 shows the effect of α on the possible number of intervals in cheap-talk equilibria for
representative values of v and v. As α increases, more consumers see only one seller, and the
platform and the sellers have more aligned incentives. This results in the platform having
an incentive to reveal the true value of v more accurately as α increases, up to a point (when
α = 1/2) in which the platform would reveal the true value of v and the sellers will price
without any uncertainty about v. A second insight is that when v increases, a cheap-talk
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Figure 3: Number of possible cheap-talk intervals (n∗) as a function of α and v when .
equilibrium is possible for lower values of α, and in such cases, it is more profitable for the
platform to select recommendations vs. pure competition.
Finally, we analyze the platform’s preferred choices in the extreme cases of α = 0 and
α = 1/2:
Proposition 7. If the platform can set α to be either 0 or 12 before committing to a pricing
regime, it will choose:
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• Centralized pricing if α = 0
• Recommendation if α = 12
• The platform always chooses to set α = 0 and centralize pricing.
The results show that although the platform would generally prefer price recommendations
coupled with limiting choice by consumers, it gains the most when consumers have more
choice but the platforms chooses prices for sellers. Because the analysis only focuses on
the extreme values of α, we are unable to tell whether there is an intermediate value of α
in which cheap talk recommendations are preferable to centralized pricing. We leave the
question of the interaction of search technology and platform pricing for future research.
1.7. Conclusion
In our analysis, we considered three pricing regimes: (i) competitive pricing by sellers; (ii)
centralized pricing by the platform; (iii) recommending prices to sellers. We find that from
the platform’s and the seller’s perspective, the optimal choice of the pricing regime depends
on the type of uncertainty prevalent in the market. If the aggregate demand uncertainty
is more important than the uncertainty about the sellers’ quality, the platform should
set prices in a centralized fashion. If the quality uncertainty is larger than the aggregate
uncertainty, the platform should let the sellers set their own prices.
A major advantage that the platform can utilize in markets when both types of uncertainties
are high are price recommendations. In this case, providing sellers with some information,
but not fully revealing it, may increase the profits of the platform above the centralized
and the no recommendation case. This increase in profits is not always feasible, as there
are cases when price recommendations will not be credible in equilibrium, and sellers will
ignore them. Another interesting finding is about which sellers prefer centralized pricing.
We found that sellers with high qualities prefer centralized pricing, although intuition would
suggest that they would have stronger pricing power and would prefer pricing autonomy.
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From the perspective of buyers, competitive decentralized pricing is almost always the best
regime. Only when the aggregate uncertainty is small and the quality uncertainty is large,
do buyers prefer centralized pricing.
Our analysis uncovers a tradeoff between maximizing the platform profit and consumer
surplus which may inform platform designers and managers. Even though we do not model
entry of buyers and sellers explicitly, higher expected consumer surplus will often lead to
more buyers using the platform and a higher expected seller profit will encourage more sellers
to join. Consequently, a growth-stage platform that is willing to sacrifice some profits for
larger market share should let sellers set their own prices. A mature platform, in contrast,
should use the profit-maximizing pricing regime. In fact, we might interpret the changes in
Airbnb’s pricing strategy as following this rule. At first, while the company was growing,
Airbnb let the hosts set their own prices. Later they introduced Price Tips, which is a price
recommendation service. The introduction of smart pricing takes Airbnb even closer to a
centralized pricing system.
The results are of course not without limitations. In order to achieve a tractable solution,
we assumed a specific simple demand form. Although we believe the results would hold in
more generalized cases, this is still an open question. A second limitation of our model,
which would be interesting to explore in future work is the amount of information buyers
have, compared to the platform and the sellers. In our model buyers have full knowledge
of all relevant model parameters, and relaxing this assumption may be important. Finally,
in our game we did not consider entry or exit of the sellers, which is one of the important
features that determines platform profits in dynamic platforms such as ride sharing.
In terms of future work, there are two interesting questions that arise naturally from our
model and we are considering to focus on. The first is further analysis of the a platform
that can design the search technology and pick α to maximize its profit. Platforms often
change the amount of search results they display to customers strategically. The second is
the impact of the share of revenue the platform takes from sellers on seller behavior. In our
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model, because sellers do not enter or exit, this share has no consequence, and extending
the model to capture this effect can be an important next step.
For policymakers, our paper suggests that price recommendation systems may soften com-
petition and potentially harm buyers, compared to not recommending prices. A critical
part of many online platforms’ business model is the status of sellers or service providers as
independent contractors, rather than employees. This allows the platforms to avoid, e.g.,
labor regulation. One criterion for determining the status of an employee vs. a contractor
is their ability to set their own price. Our paper shows that platforms do not always have
to centralize pricing to achieve profits that are above competitive. Price recommendations
allow platforms to extract large profits while avoiding the need to set prices for sellers.
Regulators should therefore consider the impact of price recommendations and its influence
on equilibrium outcomes when they consider the employment status of individuals.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Price of Fairness: Equity and Efficiency in Retail License
Allocation
2.1. Introduction
For more and more companies, fairness is becoming a priority in the areas of advertising,
targeting, product design and even pricing. Questions of fairness arise whenever limited re-
sources are allocated between different entities. There are three ways in which an allocation
procedure can be considered fair: (i) procedural, i.e., whether the same rules and standards
are applied equally to all entities; (ii) distributive, i.e., whether the resulting distribution
of resources is equal or whether any inequality of outcomes is justified; (iii) retributive (or
restorative), i.e., whether the allocation corrects past injustices, either by rewarding the
victims or by punishing the perpetrators. While much of the extant literature focuses on
procedural fairness (discrimination being a prominent example), in this paper I concentrate
on distributive and restorative fairness. Looking through this lens, it is easy to see that
the issue of fairness in marketing goes beyond machine learning and algorithms, which has
gotten the most “popular press” today as being potentially unfair (i.e., algorithmic bias,
Lambrecht and Tucker (2019); Lepri et al. (2018)). Since almost any marketing decision
is bound to redistribute resources between the company, its competitors, consumers, em-
ployees, suppliers etc, no matter how it is made, the question of fairness is always relevant.
But fairness can be at odds with the profit-maximization imperative of the firm. Many
managers regularly face a dilemma between efficiency (profit-maximization) and fairness.
I study the trade-off between fairness and efficiency using data from the legal cannabis
market in the state of Washington. One of the major concerns surrounding cannabis legal-
ization, expressed by academics and activists, is that since African-American communities
bore the brunt of the social costs of the war on drugs in the form of mass incarceration and
increased policing, African-Americans should be able to benefit the most from legal sales of
cannabis. These groups argue that benefits should come from both business ownership and
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consumer access. John Hudak writes for the Brookings Institution:
The future of cannabis policy in the United States, however, must include ex-
pungement (preferably, automatic expungement), but also more comprehensive
efforts to help the communities that have been ravaged by the War on Drugs.
...more effective policies must be implemented in legalizing states to create new
and lasting ownership opportunities for people of color and those with previous,
low-level cannabis convictions.1
These are considerations of distributive (who benefits from legalization) and restorative
(will the legalization correct past wrongs) fairness.
However, the text of the ballot initiative that legalized cannabis (I-502) does not mention
racial justice as a primary goal of the reform, instead stating explicitly that the aim of the
new approach to cannabis is to “generate new state and local tax revenue for education,
health care, research, and substance abuse prevention”.2 Washington state policymakers
found themselves making a choice similar to the one that many marketing managers cur-
rently have to consider. On the one hand, there was an explicit mandate to implement the
reform in a way that raises the most money for the state. On the other hand, the public
demanded a fair distribution of licenses.
What allocation mechanisms could the WA state government choose to ensure either ef-
ficiency or fairness? There is a large literature in economics that argues that auctions
are typically the best way to allocate resources in the most efficient manner. Auctions
are used by many governments to award contracts and licenses, including the Washington
state government that uses auctions to allocate logging rights, so there was certainly no
lack of expertise to implement this mechanism. However, the state government chose to
1“Marijuanas racist history shows the need for comprehensive drug reform”, https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2020/06/23/marijuanas-racist-history-shows-the-need-for-
comprehensive-drug-reform/, accessed on 1/4/2021
2The other two express goals are focused on law enforcement: “allows law enforcement resources to be
focused on violent and property crimes” and “take marijuana out of the hands of illegal drug organizations
and brings it under a tightly regulated, state-licensed system similar to that for controlling hard alcohol”
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use a lottery to allocate licenses. Under the lottery mechanism selected by the state of
Washington, every applicant has an equal chance of winning, so this mechanism is fair in
both a procedural and distributive sense. One might argue that if the state was concerned
about providing opportunities for minority entrepreneurs, they should have targeted them
explicitly, either by setting a quota or using a scoring mechanism (e.g., an auction, in which
a bid is adjusted by a factor that is a function of demographics of the bidder). While this
would potentially be the best way to achieve restorative fairness, there are two immediately
identifiable practical problems with this method of allocation. First of all, note that such
a mechanism is not procedurally fair. Second, this mechanism is likely to be politically
contentious, which would at best dramatically prolong the allocation process and at worst
imperil the legalization itself. Illinois allocation program is a helpful example. When Illi-
nois voted to legalize cannabis in 2019, seven years after Washington state had done so,
the legislation explicitly posited restorative justice as one of its goals. Illinois, too, chose to
allocate cannabis retail licenses by lottery. Even with restorative justice as a driving motive
for the legislation, however, the only revision they made to Washingtons allocation model
was to make it easier for minority-owned businesses to qualify for the lottery. A lottery is
the fairest mechanism for cannabis license allocation given the current political constraints.
Washington state’s cannabis market presents a unique opportunity to quantify the trade-off
between fairness and efficiency due to the availability of very detailed data on both the
applications and market transactions after the lottery. The first goal of this paper is to find
the “price of fairness”, i.e. how much money did the WA state government leave on the
table by choosing a more equitable allocation mechanism. The “price of fairness” consists
of two parts: the auction revenue and the foregone sales tax revenue the government would
have received by virtue of selecting more efficient retailers into the market. The second goal
is to document whether the efficiency gains from the auction are distributed fairly across
demographic groups. To achieve these goals, I construct a model of competition in the
recreational cannabis market.
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Since I do not observe the counterfactual auction outcomes, I take a structural approach
and explicitly model the auction allocation mechanism. In my model, firms bid for licenses
under complete information about their competitors. The winners of the auction then enter
the market and compete in prices. The value of a license for each retailer then depends
on their own characteristics and the characteristics of their competitors. Because of the
complete information assumption, this game has multiple equilibria. I overcome this issue
by a selection mechanism based on the assumption that the firm with the highest average
profitability will be the most likely to win.
I estimate an equilibrium model with nested logit demand and Bertrand-Nash pricing using
detailed transaction data from the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (WLCB)
for the period from August 2014, when the first retailers entered the market, to May 2017. I
then use the estimated model to compute retailers’ profits under counterfactual unobserved
license allocations. Given these profit functions, I find the counterfactual allocation under
the auction. Next, I compare prices, quantities and tax revenues between the auction
outcome and the lottery. The difference in tax revenue, combined with the auction revenue,
constitutes the price of fairness.
I allow firms to be heterogeneous along three dimensions: (i) cost efficiency, (ii) ability to sell
(quality of service) and (iii) location. This means that two different firms (i) face different
marginal costs (ii) face different demand due to differences in quality (iii) sell to a different
population of consumers and face different spatial competition. Location affects demand
as consumers prefer to shop closer to where they live. I get the addresses for all applicants
from the WLCB application data, which I use as the potential store locations. However,
I do not observe cost and demand efficiency for retailers who did not win the lottery. To
overcome this issue, I estimate the joint distribution of demand and cost types for the
observed retailers and assume that the types of unobserved retailers come from the same
distribution, conditional on the county. Note that due to the lottery, the set of observed
retailers is a representative sample from the set of applicants. In other words, given a fixed
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set of applicants for licenses, we do not have to adjust for selection (a la Heckman (1979))
when estimating the distribution of retailer types.
A common issue when estimating demand is price endogeneity (Villas-Boas and Winer
(1999)). I use three sets of instrumental variables to overcome this problem: (i) lagged
rainfall and temperature, which affect the production costs of cannabis; (ii) wholesale prices
in other markets; (iii) average upstream prices. I find a median price elasticity of 1.57. I
also estimate the elasticity with respect to distance of 0.19, so a 1% increase in distance is
equivalent to a 0.12% increase in price. Finally, I estimate the aggregate elasticity for the
cannabis category as a whole of 0.96, which implies that most substitution happens within
the cannabis category.
For the counterfactual results to be credible, it is crucial that my demand model and my
approach to unobserved retailers provide me with accurate predictions of demand for those
retailers and their competitors. Fortunately, the data provide an opportunity to validate my
model. Since not all firms enter the post-lottery market at the same time, I often observe
changes in market structure. In 157 instances, I observe a market before and after an entry
occurs. I select those cases and predict the post-entry equilibrium as if I do not observe
the entrant’s type. Comparing the predicted and realized market outcomes, I can get a
sense of my models accuracy. In terms of quantity, my model underpredicts by 17% on
an individual store level and only by 3% on market level. For prices, the error is smaller:
3% on individual firm and 1% on market level. Since I am mostly concerned with market
outcomes, I conclude that the model performs reasonably well.
Using the auction counterfactual, I find that compared to a lottery, an auction selects on
average more efficient retailers (with lower marginal costs and higher quality). The auction
leads to a modest increase in total quantity sold (5%). The reason that it is not even higher
(more efficient) is the high degree of substitution across products and retailers within the
same market, so most of the increase in demand for an individual retailer comes from
business-stealing, rather than market expansion. As a result, price competition intensifies
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(prices are 3% lower under auction on average). Since the increase in quantity is higher
than the decrease in prices, the sales tax revenue is 2% higher under an auction design.
According to my counterfactual, the government loses more than $8M annually in sales tax
revenue because of the choice to use a lottery. Additionally, the auction revenue is estimated
to be between $57.3 and $63M. Assuming a discount rate of 1%, the price of fairness over a
ten year horizon is more than $137M or approximately 0.39% of the state’s annual budget.
I use a machine learning algorithm by Sood and Laohaprapanon (2018) to predict applicants’
race from their names, which I collect from the Washington State Department of Labor
and Industries. Combining those predictions with my counterfactual results, I find that
compared to a lottery, an auction would lead to a loss of 10 licenses for Black applicants
and 1 license for Hispanic applicants, which is a reduction of 21% and 10% respectively.
My model allows me to estimate consumer surplus on census block group level under an
auction and a lottery. I combine these estimates with the census demographic data on racial
composition of the block groups. I find that (i) majority-White block groups’ consumer
surplus increases by 20%, while majority-Black block groups’ increases only by 3% and (ii)
consumer gains from an auction are increasing in the population share of White residents,
from 11% gain for the least White block groups to 32% for the most White. This racial
disparity cannot be explained by income differences, as the consumer gains decrease in
median household income.
I also investigate how much unfairness increases due to auction. First, I document a sub-
stantial widening of the gap between the retailers who are most likely and least likely to
receive a license when an auction is used. Second, I try to see if this inequality spills over to
the consumer side: are welfare gains geographically concentrated? I find that (a) rural areas
on average gain more from an auction than urban areas; (b) overall geographic inequality
(on census block group level) increases by 3%.
I find that the trade-off between fairness and efficiency is real and binding: a switch from
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a lottery to an auction produces substantial gains in state revenue and consumer surplus,
but also increases the inequality in ex ante probability of winning between firms and spatial
inequality between consumers. These findings are relevant to policymakers dealing with
questions of fair regulation, and to platform companies considering incorporating fairness
into their market design.
2.1.1. Related Literature
There are multiple streams of literature that this paper contributes to. First, there is
a growing literature in marketing, economics and computer science recognizing that the
issues of algorithmic fairness go beyond technical issues such as e.g. biased training data,
and cannot be solved by only developing unbiased algorithms. Rambachan et al. (2020)
argue for a larger role of economic analysis in the study of algorithmic fairness. Ali et al.
(2019) and Lambrecht and Tucker (2019) argue that cost optimization may skew the display
of broadly targeted ad campaigns if different demographics are priced differently. Nasr
and Tschantz (2020) develop bidding strategies for online auctions for advertisers to avoid
results biased by gender and to quantify the efficiency loss for bidders from those strategies.
I extend this literature by considering a fully egalitarian allocation mechanism on the part
of the platform (government) and quantifying its subsequent loss to the platform.
Second, there is a large body of theoretical work on auctions with aftermarkets, i.e. auc-
tions with downstream interactions between bidders (Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000)). Goeree
(2003), Varma (2002) consider bidding in such an auction as a signaling device and charac-
terize how different auction mechanisms affect signaling behavior. Janssen and Karamychev
(2009, 2010) study the conditions under which auctions with aftermarkets do not allocate
the licenses to the most efficient bidders. Their key insight is that even if ex ante bidder
types are independent, conditional on winning, there is a positive correlation between bidder
types. If an efficient bidder wins, they expect other winners to be even more efficient and
vice versa. If competition between inefficient bidders is soft enough, they may bid higher
than efficient bidders. In this case, an efficient equilibrium does not exist. In my paper, I
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simulate a counterfactual auction using the profit functions estimated from the data. To the
extent of my knowledge, this is first empirical paper focusing on auctions with aftermarkets.
Third, there is a stream of empirical literature studying allocation problems in general and
auctions in particular (Hendricks and Porter (1988)). Particularly relevant are the studies
which model post-allocation behavior by winning bidders. Bajari et al. (2014), An and Tang
(2019) study the allocation of incomplete procurement contracts and the hold-up problem
between the government and the contractors. Another relevant stream of literature is the
empirical work on multidimensional screening and scoring auctions (Krasnokutskaya et al.
(2020), Lewis and Bajari (2011)). In these papers, similar to mine, the seller (the principal)
has preferences over not just the cost of the project, but potentially other variables (time
to completion, quality, cost overruns). If these variables could be written into a contract,
a scoring auction can be used. Otherwise, the contract is incomplete and there is a hold
up problem. This paper adds to this literature by considering that the principal may have
preferences not only over the outcomes (e.g. revenue), but also over the characteristics of
the allocation mechanism itself (fairness).
Fourth, as cannabis legalization is becoming more common in the United States, many
scholars turned their attention to the legal cannabis market. Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019)
study the pass through rate of the sales tax in the legal cannabis market in Washington
and construct a Laffer curve for the tax. In Escudero (2019), the author considers the loss
cannabis retailers experience from using rule-of-thumb pricing instead of profit maximiza-
tion.
The paper closest to mine is Thomas (2019). In her paper, she considers the effect of the
license cap on the legal cannabis market in Washington state. Using a supply and demand
model, she simulates the market under a free entry regime and finds that it would boost
the overall surplus by 18%. To separate the effect of license cap from the effect of location
randomization, she then runs an auction counterfactual. The key difference between her
paper and mine is the focus on an entry model versus the auction. In my paper, I focus on
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capturing all possible heterogeneity among retailers that could influence their auction bids.
I investigate the efficiency of auction mechanism and the level of inequality it produces.
2.2. Background and Data
In November 2012, the state of Washington passed a ballot measure legalizing regulated
production, sale and consumption of recreational cannabis. The law created a three-tier
licensing system for producers (i.e. growers), processors (i.e. wholesalers who buy raw
cannabis and either repackage it into smaller retail amounts or convert it into pre-rolled
joints, edibles, vapes etc) and retailers.
The state was divided into 123 jurisdictions (city or town or rural area of a county outside
major cities). Retail licenses are capped on the level of jurisdiction. For example, in
Spokane county, out of 31 total licenses, 14 are assigned to Spokane, 5 to Spokane Valley
and 12 to the rest of the county. The total number of licenses was originally capped at 334
and then in January 2016 increased to 556. To apply for a license, the applicant had to
submit the proposed address for the retail operation (to check for compliance with state
law regarding proximity to schools etc) and pay an application fee of $250. In 75 out of 123
jurisdictions, the number of applicants exceeded the number of licenses and the state had to
run a lottery. These are the markets that this paper focuses on, as in the markets without
oversubscription the licenses are not contested. Retailers are not allowed to be vertically
integrated and there are restrictions on horizontal integration (one entity cannot hold more
than 3 retail licenses or more than a third of all licenses in a given jurisdiction).
Because cannabis was and still remains an illegal drug on the federal level, the policymak-
ers in Washington were very concerned about potential diversion of cannabis across state
lines. To prevent that from happening, the state implemented a bio-tracking system that
requires the producers, processors and retailers to log every operation with cannabis from
the moment a seed is planted to the final retail sale. Each plant has a unique ID, which
is then attached to the cannabis products (e.g. edibles) that are made from it. Therefore,
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the bio-tracking data contains records of all transactions on all levels of the legal cannabis
market in Washington: weight, transaction price, product type, identities of the transacting
parties, date and time of transaction.
Cannabis is not a standardized product, so there are no SKUs or equivalents. The dataset
provides 13 product categories, which I further aggregate to 5: usable cannabis (parts of the
plant, usually sold by weight or as a pre-rolled joint), solid edible, liquid edible, vape, and
other, which combines multiple small categories, such as tinctures or patches. I treat these
categories as homogenous products, i.e. I ignore the differences between different strains or
different types of solid edible (chocolate vs cookies).
Figures 4 and 5 show the historic sales and average prices by category. The vast major-
ity of sales are for the cheapest product, which is usable cannabis. There is a general
increasing trend in sales, which slows down somewhat towards the end of the sample. It
is accompanied by a downward trend in prices. This picture is consistent with more re-
tailers entering throughout the sample period, even though their total number is restricted
by the license cap. Perhaps more importantly, there is no cap on the number of licenses
for cannabis producers (growers). There is an increasing number of producers entering
the market throughout the sample period, sending the wholesale prices further and further
down. Figure 6 presents the time series of retailer margins. Margins are computed using
the wholesale prices, i.e. ζ = p−ww , where ζ is the margin, p is the retail price and w is
the wholesale price. After the initial volatile period, retail margins are fairly stable over
time, with only a slight downward trend. This implies that the downward price trend is
mostly driven by the downward trend in wholesale prices and not by increased competition
or learning.
For the purposes of the auction counterfactual, I need to establish that there is in fact
heterogeneity among retailers. In Figure 7, I present the distribution of average margins
by retailer. They are both unusually high for a retail sector (65% on average, compared to,
for example, 30-50% in grocery retail) and very dispersed. This suggests that retailers are
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Figure 4: Historical growth of cannabis retail sales in Washington
Figure 5: Time series of cannabis retail prices in Washington
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Figure 6: Time series of cannabis retail margins in Washington
heterogeneous in how they operate.
The state did not collect data on race of applicants. However, each applicant received a
Unique Business Identifier (UBI), which can be used to look up business information on
the website of Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, including the name
of the business owner. This way, I collected names of 1170 applicants, which accounts for
73.9% of all applicants. The missing names are companies that were dissolved for a long
enough time for records to be deleted. The dataset contains the names for all retailers
that won the lottery. I use a machine learning algorithm by Sood and Laohaprapanon
(2018) that predicts a person’s race based on first and last name. They use Florida voter
registration data as the training dataset. For each name, their model gives me probabilities
of that person belonging to one of 4 demographic groups: non-hispanic white, Hispanic,
non-hispanic Black and Asian.
Table 1 presents two sets of summary statistics. First, for the lottery winners, I present
the market outcomes: average monthly sales in grams, average prices (quantity-weighted)
and assortment size (average number of categories offered). Second, for the entire set of
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Figure 7: Histogram of average retailer margins
applicants, I present the characteristics of the area (2010 census tract) where the business
is located: density in ppl per square mile, median annual household income in dollars, and
median age of residents in years.
Since I only have probabilistic estimates of business owners’ racial identities, I compute the
relevant variables for all retailers and applicants and then compute an average weighted by






where Yg is the variable of interest (such as sales) conditional on owner being in group g,
R is the set of all retailers or applicants, Prg is the probability retailer r’s owner belongs to
group g.
Black retailers have the highest average sales volume and the lowest prices. Non-hispanic
white retailers have substantially higher prices, but their sales are not much lower. Asian
retailers have the lowest sales despite having second-lowest prices. Assortment sizes do
not vary much between groups, with almost everybody carrying all product types. Most
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Monthly sales Price Assortment Size Area Density Area Income Area Age
asian 13734.1 12.2 4.8 3981.08 48726.89 36.68
hispanic 14852.0 12.9 4.7 3228.70 49785.77 36.91
black 17357.0 11.9 4.8 3618.71 50575.46 38.21
non-hisp. white 16268.4 12.7 4.8 3302.85 53028.61 38.23
no name 3370.39 55723.35 38.36
Average 16031.4 12.6 4.8 3387.61 53329.52 38.13
Table 1: Retailer characteristics by race of owner. For lottery winners: monthly cannabis
sales in grams, average (quantity-weighted) price, assortment size (number of product types
available in an average month). For all applicants: density of the Census Tract in ppl/mi2,
median household income in the census tract, median age in the census tract
applicants tend to be in areas that are relatively dense, like cities and towns (for Washington
state as a whole, population density is 100 people per square mile, for King county 1000
people per squire mile). Black and Asian applicants tend to be in denser and poorer areas.
2.3. Model
2.3.1. Simplified Model
I start by analytically solving a very simplified version of my model to illustrate some of the
main forces. Suppose there is only one license to be allocated, so the winner of the lottery
or auction is going to be a monopolist. There is a population of firms applying for the
monopoly license. Their heterogeneity is captured by a two-dimensional type (η, c), where
η combines quality of the product, management and location and c is the marginal cost.
Suppose the demand in the market is linear: D(p) = η−p. Then the monopolist maximizes
profit (p(1− τ)− c)(η − p), where τ is the sales tax and the monopoly price is,
pm =
η(1− τ) + c
2(1− τ)
(2.2)
with corresponding monopoly profit equal to πm = (η(1−τ)−c)
2
4(1−τ) .
Under an auction, the firm with the highest profit in the product market wins. In other
words, for any draw of applicant types, the winner is the firm with the highest η(1− τ)− c.
Total quantity sold in this market is Q = η(1−τ)−c2(1−τ) , which implies that the auction selects
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the firm that provides the highest quantity. This means that the consumer surplus is also
the highest under an auction design.
However, as per equation 2.2 above, price is a function of the sum η(1− τ) + c, rather than
the difference. Then the prices can be higher or lower under the auction. Prices increase
under an auction, for example, if the costs are a fraction of quality, i.e., when the two types
are positively correlated. The tax revenue is τ (η(1−τ))
2−c2
4(1−τ) . Once again, the effect of the
auction is ambiguous. If the price goes down while the total quantity increases, the tax
revenue may still go down.
2.3.2. Product market
The government is allocating L licenses to N potential retailers. If L ≥ N , then each retailer
gets a license. If N > L, there is either an auction or a lottery to determine who gets the
licenses. There are min{L,N} retailers in the market. In every period t, retailer r sets the
vector of prices prt for J products. Demand for product j at retailer r at time period t,




(pjrt(1− τ)− cjrt)Djrt(pt) (2.3)
where cjrt is the marginal cost of product j in period t for retailer r and τ is the sales tax.
The retailer is maximizing profit by choosing prices for all products it is offering, taking
into account the substitution patterns between their own products, the products of their
competitors, and the outside good.
I assume that retailers set prices in a Bertrand-Nash fashion, i.e. retailer r’s prices are
optimal given the prices of all other retailers present in the market. Then the following
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system of FOCs holds for the vector of equilibrium prices p∗t :
Djrt(p
∗








= 0 j = 1, ..., J r = 1, ...,min{N,L}
(2.4)
Denote by π∗rt the equilibrium profit.
2.3.3. Demand specification
I parameterize the demand as a nested logit. The utility a consumer i gets from purchasing
product j from retailer r at time t is:
uijrt = βj − αpjrt + ηr + µt + (φ1 + φ2 ∗ densityi)dir + ξjrt + ρε̄ih(j)rt + (1− ρ)εijrt =
= Vjrt + (φ1 + φ2 ∗ densityi)dir + ρε̄ih(j)rt + (1− ρ)εijrt (2.5)
where
• βj is a product type fixed effect, which captures preferences consumers have over
different products
• α is price sensitivity, i.e. disutility from paying money for the products
• ηr is retailer fixed effect, which captures the retailer-specific characteristics, such as
customer service or assortment within a specific product type
• µt is a time fixed effect, which captures fluctuations in demand by time period common
across markets (e.g. holidays when people have more time off work, so they can
consume more cannabis)
• dir is distance between the retailer and the consumer and φ is the disutility of traveling
a mile
• the disutility of traveling is higher for urban areas than for rural areas, so it is in-
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creasing in population density around consumer i
• ξjrt is an unobserved transitory shock, specific to a particular retailer, product and
time. This shock combines all unobserved factors that may affect demand at a par-
ticular retailer at a given time, which we do not observe, i.e. weather at the retailer’s
location, local events etc. I assume that while these shocks are not observed by me,
they are observed by retailers and taken into account when setting prices
• εijrt is individual product-level shock and ε̄ih(j)rt is the nest-level shock, i.e. any
unobserved factors that increase or decrease consumer i’s utility of consumption of
cannabis of a particular product or a group of products (nest)
• Vjrt is the deterministic part of the utility that is also common for all consumers (i.e.
“average” utility of product j at retailer r in month t)
• ρ is a parameter capturing the level of substitution within the nest. If ρ = 0, the
model reverts to standard multinomial logit, in which Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) holds for all products, including the outside option. If ρ is close to
1, all substitution between products happens within the nest. IIA holds within the
nest, but not between nests.
Assuming that εijrt and ε̄ih(j)rt are type-I extreme value and normalizing the deterministic
component of the outside option to zero, I get the following purchase probability:
sijrt =







where Vih(j)rt is the inclusive value of the nest h(j), which is the nest to which product j
belongs:








and the demand for product j at retailer r in period t is
Djrt = Msjrt = M
∫
sijrtdP(i) (2.8)
where M is the market size and P(i) is the measure that captures the spatial distribution
of consumers in the market.
To proceed, I further parametrize the demand model. A time period is a month. I take
each county as a separate market. I use the 2010 census information on population by block
group to estimate the spatial distribution of consumers. Since we only observe consumers
on a block group level, the distance I use is the distance from the centroid of the block





where wb is the population weight of block group b, C is the set of all block groups in the
county. Even though the market is a county as a whole, I assume that competition for
each retailer is localized. To do this, for each block group, I find the five closest retailers
(within the county) and assume that consumers do not visit any other retailers. This way
a retailer’s demand is not affected by a price change in a retailer that is several hours drive
away.
I assume that the market size is 6 times the adult population of the county.3 I use the
nesting structure to capture the substitution between the inside and the outside good, so
all products within a market are in the same nest.
3This is based on the back-of the envelope calculation that an average person needs 0.2 grams of usable
cannabis to get intoxicated, so if every adult gets intoxicated every day of the month, the total consumption
is 6 grams per adult every month.
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2.3.4. Cost specification
I parametrize the marginal costs in the following way:
log(cjrt) = λj + ωr + ψt + νjrt (2.10)
where
• λj is the product fixed effect, as different product types have different wholesale prices
and require different costs, for example, edibles are stored differently from vapes
• ωr is a retailer fixed effect, which captures differences between retailers in their ability
to negotiate with wholesalers or in general run the business more efficiently
• ψt is a time fixed effect, as the wholesale prices may differ depending on time of the
year (e.g. lower during the harvest season).
2.3.5. Counterfactual allocation mechanism
In this subsection, I describe the proposed counterfactual allocation auction mechanism.
I assume that the retailer cost and demand types are common knowledge among retailers,
even though they are not observed by the econometrician. This means that the auction
stage is a full information game.
Denote by Ωm the set of retailers in market m. The equilibrium profit of retailer r is a
function of Ωm: πrt = πrt(Ωm). Denote by π̄r(Ωm) the total discounted future profit of
retailer r net of fixed costs. I assume that retailers have perfect foresight, they know the
types of their competitors and they do not anticipate any additional entry in the future.
Then when they are bidding for the licenses, they have no uncertainty regarding π̄r(Ωm).
I assume that the fixed costs are identical for all retailers within a market. This is a
strong assumption. On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that many of the typical
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costs of running a small business (rent, prevailing wages, utilities etc) would be similar
between retailers in the same market. On the other hand, it is also easy to imagine that
the retail stores are run very differently, which leads to differentiation in fixed costs, which
is potentially correlated with the retailer’s quality. Weakening this assumption is subject
of future work.
The allocation mechanism I consider is a uniform L+1st price auction. Since all licenses
are the same, any non-uniform price mechanism would be not envy-free and therefore not
stable, since some firms would pay more for the same license. L+1st price (i.e. everybody
pays the highest losing bid) guarantees that every market participant receives a positive
surplus in equilibrium.
Denote by b∗m the equilibrium payment in market m. Then the Nash equilibrium in market
m is a pair (Ω∗m, b
∗




m)}. Then the allocation is an equilibrium if
π̄r∗(Ω
∗
m) ≥ b∗m ≥ max
r′ /∈Ω∗m
{π̄r′(Ω∗m \ r∗ ∪ r′)} (2.11)
In other words, as long as none of the retailers that are not in the market would choose
to trade places with the least profitable retailer that is in the market, the allocation is an
equilibrium. First, note that the equilibrium payment b∗m and therefore the state’s auction
revenue is not pinned down, but it is bounded from above and below. Going forward, I will
report the maximum and the minimum of auction revenue.
Second, there are potentially multiple equilibrium allocations, i.e. Ω∗m is not guaranteed to
be unique. When I compute the auction counterfactual in section 2.6.1, I use a procedure
that mimics a descending auction or a sequence of single-license auctions. The key idea
is that the first person to enter would be the retailer which is best off independent of the
specific allocation. In entry literature, it is often assumed that firms enter the market in
order of profitability (e.g. Berry (1992)). My procedure serves the same purpose (pinning
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down a unique equilibrium) and follows a similar logic (the highest profitability firms are
most likely to be “leaders”).
More formally, I go throw the following steps:
1. Compute E(πr(Ω)) ∀r assuming all possible realizations of Ω are equally likely
2. Pick r1 = arg maxr E(πr(Ω)), i.e. the retailer with the highest a priori expected profit
3. Compute E(πr(Ω)|r1 ∈ Ω) assuming all possible realizations of Ω|r1 ∈ Ω are equally
likely
4. Pick r2 = arg maxr E(πr(Ω)|r1 ∈ Ω)
5. Compute E(πr(Ω)|{r1, r2} ⊂ Ω) assuming all possible realizations of Ω|{r1, r2} ⊂ Ω
are equally likely
6. Repeat steps 4-5 until all licenses are allocated.
I then verify that the resulting allocation is in fact a Nash equilibirum. Note that at this
stage I do not take expectation over Ω, since the distribution is degenerate (containing only
the candidate allocation with probability 1).
2.4. Estimation
In this section I discuss my approach to estimating demand, marginal and fixed costs. Then
I talk about identification and summarize the estimation results. I conclude by conducting
a validation exercise to understand whether the model can do a good job predicting demand
for retailers that I do not observe.
I estimate the model by GMM using the standard Berry et al. (1995) algorithm with a
few computational improvements taken from Conlon and Gortmaker (2019). Note that I
can compute the market shares of all products for a given vector of homogeneous utilities
V = {Vjrt} and non-linear parameters θ2 = (ρ, φ1, φ2) using equation (2.6). Call these
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market shares ŝjrt(V, θ2). I can find a vector of homogeneous utilities V (θ2) such that the
computed market shares are equal to the one observed in the data: sjrt = ŝjrt(V, θ2). This
is a non-linear system of equations that does not have a closed-form solution. Thankfully, it
can be solved using a simple iterative algorithm which is shown to be a contraction mapping
(Berry et al. (1995), Grigolon and Verboven (2014)):
log V i+1 = log V i + (1− ρ)(log s− log ŝ(V i, θ2)) (2.12)
where the i superscript denotes the algorithm’s iteration. The algorithm stops when |V i+1−
V i| < 10−8.
Note that if ρ is close to 1, equation (2.12) leads to very slow updating. To avoid this
problem, I use an accelerated version of the fixed point algorithm, SQUAREM, which is
essentially a numerical approximation of Newton-Raphson method.
Given the vector V , I can estimate all linear parameters using 2SLS to account for price
endogeneity:
Vjrt = βj − αpjrt + ηr + µt + ξjrt (2.13)
The moment condition is the following:
E(ξZ) = 0 (2.14)
where Z is the matrix of instruments, discussed in the next section.
I use the residuals ξ̂jrt(θ2) from (2.13) to construct the GMM objective function:
g = ξ̂′ZW−1Z ′ξ̂ (2.15)
where W is the weighting matrix. First I run the optimization using an identity matrix and
then I use the moments from the first step to estimate the efficient weighting matrix and
use it in the second step of the estimation.
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2.4.1. Identification
As one can see from equation (2.4), I assume that retailers take ξjrt into account when
making pricing decisions. Therefore, the prices are endogenous. I use three sets of instru-
ments, all three of which try to capture the upstream cost shocks that should shift retailers’
marginal costs, but not the demand.
1. Weather: lagged (by month) temperature and rainfall. Cannabis is an agricultural
product and a substantial portion of it is grown outdoors, so weather affects the
size of the harvest, which in turn affects the prices. I use the county-level weather
information, which is matched to the location of cannabis producers (growers). Since
every plant has a unique id number, I can trace them from producer to the final sale.
Then I take a weighted average of the weather variables for each product sold. In
other words, I take a weighted average over the producers whose products the retailer
sold in a given month. I take lags both to avoid potential effects of weather on demand
and as a reflection that past, not current, weather affects costs. The key assumption
to make these instruments valid is that past weather does not affect demand.
2. Prices of intermediate goods (plants). Since I can trace the plants from the producer
to the final sale, I can match all retail transactions with the sale price (from producer
to processor) of the original plant. This instrument is valid if the producers either
do not know or do not take into account the retail demand shocks. There are two
reasons why this is a reasonable assumption: first, upstream transactions often happen
months before the retail transactions and second, it is widely reported that producers
in this market are facing essentially perfectly competitive conditions.
3. Wholesale prices in other markets. Because of the tracing system implemented in
the state of Washington, I can match every product sold by a retailer to the whole-
sale transaction. This means that I observe the wholesale prices that retailers pay.
Wholesale prices are determined by the wholesaler costs (supply shocks) and retailer
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demand (demand shocks). If wholesalers have market power, wholesale prices will
be correlated with ξjrt. This issue is particularly acute since different retailers may
pay very different prices for the same product from the same wholesaler, in other
words, wholesalers may be price discriminating. To avoid this problem, for each
wholesaler-product-market-month, I construct the average wholesale price. Then for
each retailer-wholesaler pair, I take the average over all markets in which the whole-
saler is present, but the retailer is not. Finally, I take the average over all wholesalers
that sell the given product to the retailer in the given month, weighted by the quan-
tity. Note that different retailers within the same market will have different values of
this instrument if they contract with different wholesalers. The biggest concern about
the validity of this instrument is the risk that demand shocks are correlated across
different markets. Note that common shocks across the entire state are controlled for
by the time fixed effects.
My model has two non-linear parameters, the nesting parameter ρ and the travel costs φ1
and φ2. I need sources of exogenous variation in conditional inside market shares to identify
these two parameters (Berry and Haile (2014)). I use the following instruments: (i) number
of other products in the market and (ii) the average of the cost-shifting instruments over
all other products in the market. The intuition is that (i) if the number of other products
increases, there is more competition and any given product is less likely to be picked; (ii)
other instruments increase costs, which in turn increase prices for other products, which
cause the share of the focal product to increase.
Table 2 presents the results of the first stage. All price instruments, except for temperature,
are strongly correlated with prices.
2.4.2. Cost Estimation
I compute the marginal costs implied by equation (2.4). Note that the FOC is a linear













Table 2: First stage results, standard errors in parentheses
the estimated marginal costs ĉjrt. Some of the estimated marginal costs are negative, in
which case I replace them with 0.01.
I run a standard OLS regression of the implied marginal costs on the set of fixed effects:
time, retailer, product type:
log(ĉjrt) = λj + ωr + ψm + νjrt (2.16)
2.5. Estimation Results
The results of the demand estimation are summarized in Table 3. I estimate five models.
Usable cannabis is the most popular product, which is reflected in the product fixed effects
for all models. Not using instruments for price (column “logit no IV”), I underestimate the
price elasticity by around 50%. The median price elasticity that I find for the full model is
1.56, which is around half of the elasticity found by Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019). Only
3% of estimated elasticities fall in the inelastic range (i.e. elasticity less than 1).
I compute demand elasticity with respect to distance, which can be interpreted as percentage
change in demand as a response to 1% increase in transportation costs. I find an elasticity
of 0.19, which is less than 1/8 of price elasticity. This means that in monetary terms, a 1%
increase in distance is equivalent to 0.12 % increase in price. For the final specification, I
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logit no IV logit-IV NL-IV logit-IV-distance NL-IV-distance
Solid edible β2 -2.47 -2.30 -0.71 -2.30 -0.91
(0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.01)
liquid edible β3 -3.39 -3.09 -0.96 -3.10 -1.23
(0.02) (0.05) (0.20) (0.05) (0.02)
Vape β4 -1.31 -0.89 -0.28 -0.90 -0.38
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Other β5 -3.53 -3.39 -1.05 -3.40 -1.33
(0.02) (0.03) (0.22) (0.03) (0.01)
Price α -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance φ1 - - - -0.07 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
φ2 - - - -0.04 -8e-4
(0.00) (0.00)
Nesting ρ - - 0.69 - 0.61
(0.07) (0.08)
Market FE Y Y Y Y Y
Retailer FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y
Median price elasticity 1.05 1.56 1.49 1.33 1.57
Median distance elasticity - - - 0.22 0.19
N 33,257 33,257 33,257 33,257 33,257
Table 3: Demand estimation results, standard errors in parentheses
compute the aggregate elasticity for the category as a whole of 0.96, which implies a high
degree of substitution within the cannabis category. This means that there are not many
close substitutes for legal cannabis available to the consumers, be it illegal drugs, including
cannabis, or legal intoxicating substances like alcohol.
I estimate retailer fixed effects in the demand and cost equations, i.e. the retailer types,
which are a crucial component of the counterfactual. I plot the types in Figure 8. There is
much more heterogeneity in cost types than in demand types. Another thing to note is that
there does not seem to be a trade-off between the cost and the retailer quality: the retailers
with high demand types tend to have low cost types and vice versa. This implies that we
can think of retailer types as essentially unidimensional, with higher efficiency leading to
both lower cost and higher demand.
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Figure 8: Distribution of retailer types
2.5.1. Demand Model Validation
The key challenge for the computation of the auction counterfactual is how well I can predict
the market outcomes for unobserved market structures, i.e. what would the equilibrium
prices and quantities be in a market where some of the observed retailers are absent and
some of the unobserved retailers are present? I perform a demand validation exercise to
evaluate how well the proposed demand system handles this challenge.
To perform this evaluation, I use the observed changes in market structure and see how the
model predicts the changes in market outcomes after those changes. In the data, I observe
157 instances of retailer entry and exit, excluding the first entrants in a market. Treating
the new entrants as if I do not observe their demand and cost types, I predict the expected
prices and quantities after entry and then compare them to the observed outcomes.
Note that since I am using the demand parameters estimated on the full sample (i.e. there
is no training and holdout samples), this is primarily a test of the model’s ability to predict
a retailer’s demand and marginal costs without observing their type. When a retailer’s
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individual entrants incumbents market large market
min -0.85 -0.79 -0.85 -0.64 -0.34
5 percentile -0.54 -0.50 -0.55 -0.41 -0.22
median -0.07 0.95 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02
95 percentile 1.52 5.22 0.83 0.35 0.20
max 9.89 8.88 9.89 0.99 0.42
mean 0.17 1.38 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
st dev 1.01 1.81 0.78 0.23 0.14
N 2694 264 2430 286 165
Table 4: Summary statistics for the prediction error in quantity sold
type is unobserved, I draw from the set of types of other retailers in the same market.
This means that the task is particularly hard for markets with a smaller set of retailers, in
which a single highly successful or unsuccessful incumbent firm can drive the predictions
for entrants.
As a metric of the quality of my predictions, I compute the prediction error as a share of
the observed value. In this subsection, I focus on the prediction errors for quantity. The
validation procedure details and results for prices can be found in Appendix A. Tables 4
provides summary statistics for the prediction error in quantity. The first column presents
the summary statistics for the quantities and prices aggregated to individual retailer level,
in the second and third columns we can see the entrants and incumbents separately. The
fourth column contains the summary statistics for market-level variables. Finally, in the
fifth column I consider only markets with 6 firms and above. On the market level, especially
for large markets, the model performs reasonably well. It is particularly encouraging that
the mean and median error are close to zero. The individual predictions for entrants are
severely overestimated. The model predicts a wide range of values, but market shares are
already quite small and cannot go below zero, so the large errors cannot be matched by
small ones.
As I am primarily interested in the results for the market overall and larger markets are
more important, I conclude that my demand model performs reasonably well for the task
at hand.
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2.6. Counterfactual: Using Auctions Instead of Lotteries
2.6.1. Computation
There are two main computational challenges in computing the counterfactual. First, there
are retailers whose types I do not observe. To overcome this problem, I draw the retailer
types with replacement from the estimated distribution of retailer types conditional on
being in the given county. I draw the entire vector of types for the unobserved retailers 500
times for each county and compute the lottery and auction outcomes for these draws, after
which I take the average across them to get the expected auction and lottery outcomes.
The second challenge is that to perform the equilibrium selection procedure described in
subsection 2.3.5, I need to take the expectation E(πr(Ω)) over possible allocations Ω re-
peatedly. The set of all possible allocations grows very quickly with both the number of
applicants and the number of licenses. Again, I compute the expectation by taking Monte-
Carlo draws from the underlying set of allocations and computing the profits for those
draws. At each stage of the equilibrium selection, I perform a 1000 draws, until the full set
of possible allocations is smaller than 1000. Note that this implies that at the last stage
(i.e. when I am selecting the last retailer to receive a license, I always compute the full set
of possible allocations and guarantee that the outcome I find is a Nash equilibrium).
Since the licenses are capped at the local level (i.e. at the town or city level or county
at large), quite often there would be multiple auctions within a county. In this case, the
outcomes in one auction affect the profits of retailers in the other auction. To deal with
this issue, I run the auctions “simultaneously”, i.e. the first license in both auctions is
allocated based on unconditional expectation, but the expectation for the second round of
the auctions is computed conditional on both winners being in the market etc.
Once both the types and the set of retailers are drawn, I can compute the market equilibrium
by iterating over the FOCs.
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2.6.2. Revenue and market outcomes under auction and lottery
Table 5 summarizes the key market outcomes for the counterfactual auction and lottery.
The first two columns show the expected annual quantity sold in kilograms. In all markets,
the auction leads to an increase in quantity, with the overall increase of 5%. This is a
relatively modest increase, which corresponds to the finding of high degree of substitution
between products within the same market (i.e. high ρ). If a particular retailer becomes
more efficient or lowers prices, most of their demand will come from other retailers rather
than from expanding the market. Columns 4 and 5 show the quantity-weighted prices.
Here we find that the auction leads to a 3% decrease in prices. As firms become more
efficient, but can’t expand the market too much, the price competition becomes stronger.
Finally, columns 6 and 7 show the expected yearly sales tax revenue (in $1000s) of the
WA state government under lottery and auction respectively. I find that the tax revenue
is 2% higher under the auction, as the decrease in prices is outstripped by the increase
in quantity. Note that while the auction increases quantities in all markets, the effect for
prices and tax revenue is mixed. The intuition is that higher quality, lower costs and more
accessible locations all lead to an increase in quantity, while the effect on prices is mixed:
higher quality and better locations increase prices, while lower costs lead to lower prices.
Table 6 summarizes more market outcomes for the auction and lottery. First, we look
at the average demand (ν̄) and cost (ω̄) types for the market participants under the two
allocation mechanisms. In case of lottery, these are just averages across the types observed
in the given county. In case of auction, this is the average across the types that win the
auction. The demand type is uniformly higher across all counties, while the cost type is
typically lower with the exception of a few markets. This implies that auctions are mostly
driven by selection on demand type, i.e. quality. The average increase in demand type
across all markets is 29 % and the average decrease in the cost type across all markets is
16%. In columns “Rmax” and “Rmin” I present the upper and lower bounds on the auction
revenue in each market (in $1000s). The total auction revenue is estimated to be between $
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County Q lottery Q auction %∆Q P lottery P auction % ∆P Tax lottery Tax auction % ∆τPQ
King 19838.20 20123.66 1% 17.08 17.11 0% 105592.23 107259.99 2%
Pierce 8832.78 9087.97 3% 14.59 14.53 0% 40263.41 41245.20 2%
Snohomish 8601.77 8880.23 3% 14.52 14.46 0% 38932.50 40031.21 3%
Spokane 8519.89 8734.69 3% 13.79 13.81 0% 35823.68 36783.70 3%
Clark 6312.75 6565.95 4% 16.46 16.19 -2% 31325.99 32036.14 2%
Thurston 4180.16 4330.62 4% 12.08 12.15 1% 15473.46 16121.24 4%
Whatcom 3188.71 3337.80 5% 15.13 15.08 0% 14867.88 15505.84 4%
Kitsap 3000.10 3138.35 5% 15.30 15.27 0% 14171.67 14795.20 4%
Cowlitz 2086.43 2222.14 7% 11.80 11.14 -6% 7319.27 7354.62 0%
Skagit 2077.77 2224.26 7% 16.37 15.72 -4% 10388.92 10670.66 3%
Grays Harbor 1448.03 1534.96 6% 11.74 10.81 -8% 5206.95 5074.39 -3%
Benton 1438.43 1898.10 32% 22.17 19.16 -14% 9003.87 9766.09 8%
Clallam 1366.03 1421.66 4% 11.22 10.42 -7% 4743.83 4579.11 -3%
Yakima 1273.86 1500.88 18% 14.83 14.16 -4% 5706.54 6393.61 12%
Island 1246.35 1369.67 10% 14.93 13.56 -9% 5623.44 5612.79 0%
Whitman 1240.83 1293.13 4% 9.23 8.08 -12% 3482.23 3177.88 -9%
Chelan 883.20 938.26 6% 13.77 13.32 -3% 3663.44 3761.43 3%
Asotin 868.40 977.86 13% 9.93 6.29 -37% 2638.47 1884.31 -29%
Walla Walla 862.71 999.88 16% 7.22 1.86 -74% 1959.32 584.22 -70%
Kittitas 853.05 923.42 8% 10.05 8.91 -11% 2628.58 2540.72 -3%
Mason 807.94 894.59 11% 13.64 12.72 -7% 3400.70 3525.87 4%
Grant 730.22 777.65 6% 15.60 14.82 -5% 3457.41 3491.28 1%
Jefferson 727.56 799.55 10% 12.73 11.61 -9% 2891.23 2893.70 0%
Lewis 423.40 447.06 6% 13.89 14.62 5% 1800.25 2000.44 11%
Klickitat 338.38 400.78 18% 21.54 20.89 -3% 2135.90 2453.39 15%
Douglas 335.40 549.29 64% 17.58 11.34 -36% 1550.83 1656.25 7%
Stevens 270.98 340.18 26% 15.34 15.23 -1% 1248.98 1557.01 25%
Okanogan 207.97 239.68 15% 20.47 18.81 -8% 1292.59 1369.21 6%
Pacific 195.74 249.76 28% 14.79 16.64 13% 887.16 1274.22 44%
Skamania 178.56 194.61 9% 18.46 18.32 -1% 991.76 1072.83 8%
San Juan 161.93 234.90 45% 9.15 3.45 -62% 445.19 243.52 -45%
Ferry 49.98 88.75 78% 10.12 10.12 0% 156.25 277.35 78%
Adams 46.60 66.46 43% 20.31 20.12 -1% 292.30 413.02 41%
Pend Oreille 8.44 11.44 35% 13.07 13.07 0% 34.04 46.14 36%
Franklin 6.52 6.55 0% 16.46 16.46 0% 33.59 33.76 1%
Total 82609.06 86804.76 5% 14.94 14.55 -3% 379433.85 387486.33 2%
Table 5: Lottery and auction outcomes by county: average quantity per year in kg, average
weighted price, average annual tax income in $1000
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63.1M and $57.3M. The last two columns present the number of licenses that are auctioned
(i.e. excluding the markets in which licenses were not oversubscribed) and the number of
applicants for those licenses. As expected, the more oversubscribed markets see a higher
auction revenue per license (e.g. compare Spokane county with 3 applicants per license to
similarly-sized Clark and Pierce county with 9 and 5 applicants per license).
What is the price of fairness? Considering only the state’s revenue, the government receives
an extra $8M every year in perpetuity in taxes from the auction in addition to the immediate
auction revenue of at least $57.3M. Assuming a discount rate of 1% and taking the time
horizon to be 10 years, the price of fairness is approximately $137M. For perspective, the
WA state budget for 2014 was $35.1B, so the price of fairness is 0.39% of the state’s annual
budget.
2.6.3. Racial disparities in gains from auction
I have established that by all aggregate metrics (tax revenue and consumer surplus), res-
idents of the state of Washington would be better off if the retail cannabis licenses were
allocated by an auction instead of lottery. However, policymakers may consider the distri-
bution of efficiency gains from an auction, namely whether the demographic groups that
were most negatively affected by drug criminalization are not left behind by the reform.
In this subsection, I consider (i) the ownership of licenses under auction and lottery and
(ii) the distribution of consumer gains from an auction. I establish that auction results in
expected loss of 10 licenses for Black applicants, which is a 21% reduction. All of these
licenses go to white applicants. The gains in consumer surplus (i) accrue disproportion-
ately less to majority black and majority asian areas; (ii) accrue disproportionately more to
majority-white areas, and (iii) are positively correlated with the population share of white
residents on the block group level. This disparity cannot be explained by differences in
income, as lower income areas benefit more from the auction than higher income areas.
I start with ownership. Table 7 summarizes the results. Overall, the state population in
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County ν̄ lottery ν̄ auction %∆ν ω̄ lottery ω̄ auction % ∆ω Rmax Rmin L N
King -0.51 -0.50 1% 0.19 0.19 1% 25,274.06 23,687.74 84 458
Pierce -0.48 -0.46 5% -0.95 -1.00 -5% 2,889.02 2,781.56 28 152
Snohomish -0.36 -0.34 6% -1.66 -1.71 -3% 5,133.50 4,934.16 38 149
Spokane 0.08 0.10 32% -2.20 -2.19 1% 1,419.78 1,382.30 31 106
Clark -0.01 0.01 195% 0.24 0.13 -48% 4,003.96 3,856.34 13 113
Thurston 0.02 0.05 156% -2.98 -3.04 -2% 3,824.92 3,321.28 21 67
Whatcom -0.03 0.00 98% -1.41 -1.52 -7% 5,265.10 3,960.68 24 61
Kitsap -0.44 -0.41 7% -0.35 -0.36 -3% 2,404.33 2,160.75 19 76
Cowlitz 0.29 0.34 17% -2.53 -2.88 -14% 64.80 56.20 8 22
Skagit 0.12 0.21 71% -0.92 -1.04 -14% 1,287.80 1,212.25 13 34
Benton 0.32 0.38 18% -3.78 -4.13 -9% 890.05 785.19 3 28
Grays Harbor 0.05 0.16 226% -4.70 -5.52 -17% 4,203.99 4,068.92 9 24
Yakima 0.32 0.34 9% -4.60 -5.01 -9% 965.69 875.06 8 37
Clallam -1.00 -0.88 13% -0.90 -1.47 -64% 231.82 222.66 8 26
Island 0.14 0.32 128% -2.32 -3.29 -42% 378.54 344.36 6 10
Whitman 0.96 0.99 3% -4.77 -5.47 -15% 137.67 116.03 4 9
Walla Walla -0.07 0.01 116% -1.43 -1.71 -20% 399.06 299.32 2 11
Asotin 0.46 0.49 5% -7.27 -11.38 -56% 341.76 334.95 2 5
Chelan 1.55 1.63 6% -7.84 -10.53 -34% 356.60 255.62 6 14
Kittitas 0.41 0.49 20% -2.69 -3.67 -36% 342.66 309.22 6 20
Mason 0.05 0.13 132% -2.69 -3.05 -13% 600.79 553.55 6 21
Jefferson 0.57 0.67 16% -2.00 -2.65 -32% 190.94 177.26 7 18
Grant -0.28 -0.22 20% -1.84 -2.26 -23% 443.87 346.40 8 21
Douglas -0.31 -0.26 15% -7.28 -8.49 -17% 79.28 (31.70) 2 12
Lewis 0.86 1.04 21% -5.71 -5.08 11% 170.05 157.45 2 13
Klickitat -0.11 0.20 289% -4.63 -8.39 -81% 918.96 534.60 3 7
Stevens -0.45 -0.26 44% -4.49 -5.51 -23% 56.26 49.65 5 7
Pacific -0.35 -0.22 37% -2.21 -3.39 -53% 401.11 256.28 3 14
Okanogan 0.35 0.43 20% -6.66 -7.71 -16% 77.01 71.90 4 11
San Juan 1.14 1.14 0% -17.73 -17.73 0% 46.34 41.76 2 11
Skamania -0.23 0.03 115% -6.88 -11.77 -71% 143.42 113.55 1 6
Ferry 0.81 0.81 0% -22.66 -22.66 0% 151.64 53.16 1 3
Adams -0.24 -0.16 36% -4.07 -6.88 -69% 20.34 18.70 3 5
Pend Oreille -1.15 -1.15 0% -16.13 -16.13 0% 31.16 30.89 1 4
Franklin -1.14 -1.14 0% -16.42 -16.42 0% 1.11 0.79 1 8
Total -0.15 -0.11 29% -1.93 -2.23 -16% 63,147.38 57,338.84 382 1583
Table 6: Lottery and auction results: average demand type (ν̄), average cost type (ω̄), max-
imum and minimum auction revenue, number of licenses allocated and number of applicants
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Applicants Share Lottery Share Auction Share
Non-hispanic white 867 54.8% 211 55.4% 221 57.8%
Hispanic 45 2.8% 11 2.8% 10 2.7%
Black 138 8.7% 38 10.0% 30 7.9%
Asian 120 7.6% 28 7.4% 28 7.4%
Name NA 413 26.1% 93 24.3% 92 24.2%
Total 1583 100% 382 100% 382 100%
Table 7: Predicted race of license owners under auction and lottery
2010 was 77% white, 7% Asian, 3.6% Black, 1.5% Native American, 0.6% Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander and 10% other or biracial. The applications columns suggests that Black
residents of WA were disproportionately more likely to apply for a cannabis license. Under
lottery, on average 38 of them would receive a license. However, under auction, only 30
would, which is a 21% decrease in the number of Black cannabis licensees under auction.
Similarly, auction would lead on average to a loss of 1 license (10% of all licenses) by a
Hispanic applicant. This indicates that the concerns about fair distribution of licenses are
well-founded.
Now consider the distribution of consumer gains. Since the state does not collect data on
individual consumers, I use geographic variation to identify racial disparities. Using 2010
census data, I collect the demographic compositions on block group level and combine it
with my counterfactual estimates of consumer surplus. First way I try to proxy for racial
groups is by identifying block groups in which that group counts for more than 50% of
the population. Table 8 presents the results. While non-Hispanic and Hispanic white-
majority areas enjoy a 20% and 27% increase in consumer surplus respectively, Black and
Asian-majority areas see only a 3% increase. Native American-majority areas and areas
with no demographic majority also receive less than the average increase, at 13% and 12%
respectively.
Note that in absolute terms, according to my metric, every demographic group benefits
from the auction. However, in relative terms, the benefits are disproportionately received
by white WA residents. However, I am drawing conclusions from a relatively small number
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number of block groups population ∆CS HH income
Non-Hispanic white 4,196 5,878,871 20% 65,423.10
no majority 455 656,232 12% 46,763.59
Asian 29 41,490 3% 63,586.18
Hispanic white 31 56,105 27% 34,454.56
Native American 14 16,898 13% 36,765.28
Other 31 60,888 55% 31,940.00
Black 10 14,056 3% 31,746.87
Total 4,766 6,724,540 19% 60,392.86
Table 8: Consumer benefits of auction on the block level, divided by the race of majority
of residents.
of block groups, in particular, there is only 10 block groups that are majority Black and
most Black people in Washington live outside of those block groups. To alleviate this
problem, I divide the block groups by decile of share of white residents, i.e. group 0 are
the blocks with the lowest share of white residents (5%-56%) and group 9 are the blocks
with the highest share of white residents (97%-100%). The results are presented in table
9. Now all groups are approximately the same size. I find that the gains from the auction
are increasing in the share of white residents. In particular, group 0 sees an 11% increase
in consumer surplus and group 9 sees a 32% increase. Another common concern is that
the market underprovides services in minority or poor areas (e.g. food deserts). For each
block group, I compute the probability that at least one store is located within it. The last
two columns in Table 9 show the probabilities of at least one store being located within an
average block group of a given decile. There seems to be no relationship between the share
of white residents and store location both under auction and under lottery.
Another important variable that is correlated with racial composition of a block group is
income. If retailers receive higher profits in higher income areas, the stores in those areas
will be more likely to win the auction, which would in turn explain the racial disparity
documented above. To investigate this mechanism, I divide the block groups into deciles
by median household income from 2010 census and compute the average consumer surplus
gain from the auction for each decile. Figure 9 shows that in fact the highest income block
groups tend to receive less benefit from the auction. Specifically, the lowest income areas
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Decile interval # of BGs population HH income ∆CS P(store) auction P(store) lottery
0 [5%,56%] 477 700,354 50314.40 11% 5% 5%
1 [56%,68%] 476 723,748 59755.21 13% 8% 7%
2 [68%,75%] 476 684,491 62297.13 20% 6% 6%
3 [75%,81%] 476 692,128 62332.02 15% 8% 8%
4 [81%,85%] 477 683,560 66208.13 15% 6% 6%
5 [85%,88%] 476 655,089 65067.42 15% 6% 7%
6 [88%,91%] 476 660,942 68240.89 21% 7% 7%
7 [91%,94%] 476 680,314 63975.55 19% 6% 6%
8 [94%,97%] 476 667,461 66793.58 21% 6% 6%
9 [97%,100%] 477 575,468 65207.88 32% 5% 5%
Table 9: Consumer benefits of auction on the block level, divided by decile of share of white
residents
increase their consumer surplus by 21%, while the highest income areas only by 10%. This
means that the racial disparity cannot be driven by income differences between demographic
groups. Once again, we consider the location of the retailers. Figure 10 shows the average
probability that a store is located within a block group by income decile. Stores are less
likely to be located in lower-income areas. The allocation mechanism has little to no effect.
2.6.4. How much fairness is lost?
I started this paper from the premise that lottery is chosen by the WA state government
as an allocation mechanism for cannabis licenses because of fairness considerations. In this
section I try to quantify the difference in fairness between a lottery and an auction in order
to test my assumption.
A lottery gives all participants within a market an equal chance of winning, so I compute
the probability of winning in lottery and in auction conditional on (i) location and (ii) type.
Figures 11 and 12 show these probabilities, sorted from highest to lowest. Note that the
order of retailers is not the same for lottery and auction, so the same position on the x axis
does not necessarily correspond to the same retailer.
First, note that the probability of winning is far from uniform in a lottery, as some markets
are more oversubscribed than others. Second, in both figures there is a similar pattern of
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Figure 9: Percentage increase in consumer surplus from the auction as a function of median
household income decile.
Figure 10: Probability of at least one store being present in an average block group as a
function of median household income decile.
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Figure 11: Probability of winning conditional on location, from the least to the most suc-
cessful location, for auction and lottery
Figure 12: Probability of winning conditional on type, from the least to the most successful
type, for auction and lottery
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increasing probability on the upper end of the distribution and of decreasing on the lower
end. Quantitatively, the top 20% locations have an average 52% chance of winning under
auction and only 43% under lottery, while the bottom 20% of locations have an average 7.5%
chance of winning under auction and 11% chance of winning under lottery. The results are
even more dramatic for types: for the top 20% of types, the chance of winning on average
is 61% under auction and 48% under lottery; for the bottom 20% of types, the chance of
winning is 11% under auction and 16% under lottery.
Does the increase in “inequality of opportunity” under auction spill over to consumers?
One possible concern is that under auction, all retailers will move to densely-populated,
urban areas and rural consumers will be worse off. Figure 13 shows the map of which
areas in Washington state are better off under auction (in yellow), and which are better
off under lottery (in purple). It is clear that many of the states rural areas are better off
under auction, while some urban areas–most notably Spokane–are worse off. The correlation
between population density and percentage difference between the consumer surplus under
auction and lottery is 0.1, so the relationship is at best very weak. I also use the list
of census designated places (CDP) in WA to identify urban and rural blocks and compute
average population-weighted difference between consumer surplus under auction and lottery.
I define a block as urban if it lies within a CDP with ”City” in its name and rural if it either
lies in a CDP that is neither city nor town or if it is not a part of any CDP. I find a 20%
increase in consumer surplus in urban areas and 25% increase in consumer surplus in rural
areas. I conclude that rural areas would not be on average worse off under an auction.
I also consider the overall spatial inequality, beyond the urban/rural division. Does the
auction increase inequality in consumer surplus between block groups? I compute the Gini
coefficient for the distribution of consumer surplus across all block groups. I find that, under
lottery, the coefficient is equal to 0.6, while under auction, it is 0.62, so there is 3% increase
in spatial inequality. Figure 14 shows the Lorentz curve for the distribution of consumer
surplus. The curve for a lottery is very slightly to the left of the curve for an auction.
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Figure 13: Areas that are better off under auction (yellow) vs under lottery (purple)




Many managers are now facing a choice between profit-maximization (a traditional goal of
private enterprise) and fairness (due to increasing public pressure to incorporate it in the
decision-making process). I study this trade-off in the context of cannabis legalization in
the state of Washington. Questions of fairness are often raised when cannabis legalization is
discussed. As marginalized groups bore the brunt of negative effects of drug criminalization
and the war on drugs, it is only fair that members of those groups should be the major
beneficiaries of legalization. However, the explicit goal of legalization was to raise tax
revenue for the state budget. The policymakers chose to allocate retail licenses by lottery.
My goal in this paper is to predict the license allocation if the state chose to allocate licenses
by auction and compare the outcomes.
To achieve that goal, I estimate the equilibrium in the Washington cannabis market using
the detailed data provided by the state Liquor and Cannabis Board (WLCB), which keeps
track of every ounce of product from growing and harvesting to the final retail sale. I
estimate the price elasticity, the travel cost for consumers, the marginal costs, and the
distribution of heterogeneity among retailers in terms of their quality (i.e. their effect
on demand) and cost effectiveness. I then use these estimates to simulate counterfactual
license allocations under lottery and auction mechanisms. The key challenge is predicting
the behavior of retailers who applied for a license, but did not win, and therefore are not
observed in the data. I use the application data from WLCB for their location information
and draw their types from the estimated distribution of heterogeneity.
The results show that (i) the auction does in fact select more efficient retailers (ii) it leads
to a market expansion of 5% and (iii) a 3% reduction in prices. The auction leads to a 2%
or $8M increase in state tax revenue compared to lottery. Taking into account the auction
revenue, the price of fairness over a 10 year window is $137M. There is no tradeoff between
state revenue and consumer surplus (typical for “sin goods”): under the auction, cannabis
consumers are substantially better off: they visit higher quality retailers and pay lower
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prices.
Using a machine learning algorithm to predict the applicants’ racial identity from their first
and last name, I find the expected number of licenses going to each demographic group
under auction and lottery. I find that under auction Black applicants receive 21% less
licenses and Hispanic applicants receive 10% less licenses.
I document racial disparities in the distribution of consumer benefits from the auction. First,
while majority-white block groups receive 20% higher consumer surplus under auction,
in majority-Black areas consumer surplus increases on average by only 3%. In general,
the consumer gain from auction is increasing in the population share of white residents:
while the least white block groups receive 11% higher consumer surplus, the most white
block groups receive 32% higher consumer surplus. This disparity cannot be explained by
differences in median household income, as the increase in consumer surplus is decreasing
in median household income, so controlling for income, the racial disparity should be even
stronger. These findings imply that concerns over fairness were well-founded.
Finally, I try to quantify the amount of equity lost when using an auction instead of a lottery.
I compute the a priori probability of winning a license conditional on a firm’s location or
type under both mechanisms. The lottery does not provide perfectly equal chances of win-
ning to everybody, as different markets have different numbers of applicants for a different
number of licenses. However, under an auction, we see a substantial increase in “inequality
of opportunity” conditional on location and an especially high increase in inequality con-
ditional on retailer type. Another concern is spatial inequality among consumers: does an
auction lead to all retailers concentrating in urban centers leaving the rural areas worse off?
My model allows for the investigation of this question by estimating consumer surplus on
2010 census block group level. I find that the consumer gains or losses are not correlated
with population density or whether the area is urban or rural. In fact, I find that while ur-
ban areas are on average 20% better off under auction, rural areas are 25% better off. I also
find that the Gini coefficient of (population-weighted) spatial inequality is 3% higher under
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auction compared to lottery, so spatial inequality is only slightly higher under auction.
My findings could be useful for platform companies who increasingly have to incorporate
fairness considerations into the platform design. I show that a switch from a mechanism
that prioritizes efficiency, such as auction, to a mechanism that prioritizes equity, such as
a lottery, can lead to lower profits for the platform and lower consumer surplus. How-
ever, practitioners should keep in mind that the benefits of the increased efficiency may be
unequally distributed, raising fairness considerations.
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CHAPTER 3 : Investigating the Effects of Network-Studio Affiliation on TV
Advertising of Motion Pictures 1
3.1. Introduction
An increasing number of markets for products and services is intermediated through two-
sided platforms. Often platforms also produce some of the products that compete on these
markets, raising concerns from policymakers and the press about preferential treatment
the platforms may show towards their own products. For example, competition authorities
have raised concerns that Google uses its search engine to promote own products (e.g. Pixel
phones, Nest smart thermostats). Similarly, Amazon features its own private label products
prominently in the search results for most product categories. Defenders of these companies
point out that such behavior does not necessarily imply bias, since those products may be
the ones that meet customer needs best. These settings highlight a well-known tension
between pro- and anti-competitive aspects from vertical integration. On the one hand, the
integrated firm may increase rivals costs or make it harder to reach consumers, leading to
potential foreclosure. On the other hand, the elimination of double marginalization creates
efficiencies from integration. In these newer settings, the ‘input’ provided by the platform
is preferential access to advertising exposure, which may give competitive advantage to the
integrated product.
The market for television advertising presents a similar setting, as three out of the four ma-
jor television broadcasters are owned by a media conglomerate that also owns a major movie
studio: in 2011 the relationships are NBC and Universal, ABC and Disney, and FOX and
20th Century.2 Television advertising is an important competitive tool for movie studios,
as promotional expenditures typically account for about one third of the full cost of a movie
(from Elberse and Anand (2007), for discussion of role of advertising in competition between
1Based on work with Sylvia Hristakeva and Julie Mortimer
2The main broadcasters in the U.S. are ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX. Ten years later, in 2021, it is again
three out of four, but in a different configuration, with CBS owned by Viacom and FOX separated from
20th Century.
75
studios, see also Eliashberg et al. (2006), Rao et al. (2017)). In addition, industry practi-
tioners agree that integrated studios benefit from preferential treatment when advertising
on sister networks. That is, affiliation between a movie studio and a broadcast network is
likely to give it access to cheaper advertising; therefore, one expects that affiliated networks
would benefit from a competitive advantage.
We also see the preferential treatment of integrated services in the times of “streaming
wars.” Companies that are launching own streaming services are extensively relying on own
platforms to reach customers. For example, NBCUniversal planned to spend more than
twice as much on own television channels and platforms to promote its Peacock service;
Disney+ and Paramount+ also rely on the promotional ad inventory of the integrated
company.3 Furthermore, in 2019 Disney banned Netflix ads on its television networks.
Initially, Disney “put out an edict to staffers that it wouldn’t accept ads from any rival
streaming services, but later reversed course and found a compromise with nearly every
company, the people familiar with the situation said. The exception was Netflix.”4
Our empirical analysis investigates whether movie studios benefit from their affiliation with
broadcast television networks. An ideal dataset would include not only product-market
data, but also information on advertising quantities and individual prices paid by movie
studios at each broadcast network. Unfortunately, advertising prices are considered trade
secrets and are rarely available to researchers. Instead, our approach focuses on movie stu-
dios’ advertising exposure across broadcast networks. We ask: do integrated studios direct
a higher share of advertising exposure to their affiliated networks? The analysis is based
on the Rentrak dataset from 2011 -2013, which tracks all instances of national advertising
with a rich set of characteristics, including time, position during within the ad break, copy,
product, brand, advertiser and parent company, as well as telecast characteristics, such
as viewership among various demographics. Information on advertising exposures across
3 Source: WSJ,https://www.wsj.com/articles/paramount-marketing-push-will-rely-heavily-on-
viacomcbs-networks-11611313200, accessed on 4/11/2021
4Source:WSJ,https://www.wsj.com/articles/disney-bans-netflix-ads-as-streamings-
marketing-wars-intensify-11570199291, accessed on 4/11/2021
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products is more easily accessed by researchers, say by scraping websites, than getting data
on advertising prices or product market sales; hence, our approach may be applied to many
settings where researchers do not have detailed or proprietary product market information.
A major challenge for this analysis is to separate the affiliation incentives from potential
unobserved match values between the affiliated studio and the network. Suppose that we
find that Disney advertises more on ABC than on other broadcast networks. This may
be explained by a vertical integration rationale in which ABC takes into account Disney’s
profits and sets a lower advertising price for the movie studio. However, the observed
exposure may also be explained by an unobserved match between Disney’s movies and
ABC’s programming. For example, if ABC’s programming is likely to reach the audience
of interest for the average Disney movie.
To separate these two effects, we use a matching strategy in the spirit of DellaVigna and
Hermle (2017), which exploits the advertising exposures of all products to capture the un-
observed “preferences” that advertisers have for networks’ content. We exploit the detailed
information available in the ad-placement dataset, where we observe all national ad place-
ments for more than 30,000 distinct products. For each movie we identify the products
with similar advertising strategies and hence similar target audiences. To do so, we use
clustering based on product advertising exposure on non-affiliated cable networks, such as
FOOD, AMC, BET, which likely reach different audiences. This approach allows us to
control for potential unobserved match values between a movie and the programming on
broadcast. We find a lot of variation in the products matched to different movie types.
To investigate efficiencies from vertical integration we check whether integrated studios
advertise relatively more on affiliated networks than other products with similar advertising
strategies. We implement the analysis with a difference-in-differences approach, where the
matched products serve as a control group. We find significant affiliation effects for ABC-
Disney and FOX-20th Century relationships, but not for NBC-Universal. We also confirm
the robustness of our findings by testing for heterogeneity in treatment effects across movie
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budgets and genres. The intuition is that if the estimated treatment effect is driven by
affiliation, then movie characteristics should be irrelevant, as they are already controlled
for by the matched products. However, if some of the effect is driven by the movie content,
then it would show up as heterogeneity, since movies of different genres target different
audiences. We find no evidence of significant heterogeneity.
Our result suggests a wedge between affiliated and non-affiliated studios, which is likely
driven by increases in efficiency. A simple theoretical example shows that ABC has incen-
tives to both decrease the advertising cost to Disney and to raise the cost to a competitor,
e.g. Paramount Pictures. To shed light on the potential anti-competitive effects from
vertical integration, we investigate whether broadcast networks may put competing movie
studios at a disadvantage. Here, we match unaffiliated studios to other products based on
their advertising strategies on (unaffiliated) cable networks. Then, we ask whether, e.g.
Paramount Pictures advertises less on ABC than other products with similar advertising
strategies. We do not find significant effects.
Our findings are relevant to policymakers and practitioners considering the implications
of vertical relations in the context of two-sided markets. We do not explicitly model the
downstream market and quantify the efficiency effects. For many settings of policy interest,
researchers do not have access to sales and pricing data, which would allow us to quantify
the effects. As a result, our approach may be more widely applied to inform potential
efficiency and anti-competitive effects across two-sided markets.
3.2. Theoretical motivations
The welfare effects of vertical integration are ambiguous because it may both increase effi-
ciency for the integrated firm and have anti-competitive effects for the other players in the
market. Vertical integration allows the firm to align incentives along the channel, which
we typically see through a decrease in double marginalization. In the market for televi-
sion advertising, the decrease in double marginalization implies that the affiliated studio
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would likely access advertising inputs at lower prices and increase its advertising exposure.
The anti-competitive effects come from the concern that the integrated television network
has incentives to charge higher prices to rival studios, likely decreasing their advertising
exposures and market shares.
We introduce a stylized theoretical example to showcase the efficiency and foreclosure
concerns in the analyzed market. Suppose there are two movie studios, Disney (D) and
Paramount (P) and one television network selling advertising exposures, ABC. Studios
compete à la Hotelling with Disney located at 0 and Paramount located at 1. We set down-
stream prices to 1 for simplicity; this also matches with the industry practice that studios
do not compete on prices of movie tickets. Instead, studios rely on advertising to increase
demand.5 We model advertising in this market as persuasive, that is, advertising increases
consumers’ utilities of the movie directly. The interpretation is that the social aspect of
watching a movie accounts for a large part of the utility from watching a movie. Movies that
are widely advertised are seen by a broader audience and create more discussion between
the people who saw it and fear of missing out for those who did not. Let consumer i’s utility
from going to see a movie by studio j = {D,P} be:
Uij = v + αjAj − γjA2j − dij . (3.1)
We borrow the linear-quadratic specification from Chintagunta and Jain (1992) and Chin-
tagunta (1993). dij is the distance between consumer i and studio j, capturing the taste
match between the consumer and the studio. Advertising is persuasive, captured by αj > 0,
but its effect is decreasing with the amount of advertising, captured by γj > 0. Note that
5We assume that ABC’s content is homogeneous. An alternative assumption is that we are considering
the advertising market only for a specific TV show and different shows are not substitutes from the studios’
perspective, i.e. different shows are watched by non-overlapping groups of viewers. Note that, given the
large share of promotional advertising in networks (ABC advertising other ABC programming), this market
is unlikely to face capacity constraints.
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To highlight some of the empirical complications, we allow that studios are heterogeneous
in advertising effectiveness. The pair (αj , γj) may capture: (i) differences in the match
value between a studio and the network’s programming and viewers; (ii) differences in
the quality of each studio’s ad copy. Under the first interpretation, ABC’s content may
attract viewers who are more likely to be affected by Disney’s advertising. The idea that
Disney’s advertising for “Frozen” may be more effective during family programming than
content attracting single men, and ABC may be creating content that is more family friendly
than the other broadcasters. We focus on the first interpretation because it highlights the
empirical complications of controlling for match value between a studio and its affiliated
networks. In addition, we analyze major studios that invest heavily in advertising; thus,
it is unlikely that any studio would have a persistent disadvantage in the quality of its ad
copy (talented video editors/copywriters can be poached, and techniques can be copied).
Let v > 1, so consumers choose one of the two movies, and the consumer at x̃ is indifferent




(1 + αDAD − γDA2D − αPAP + γPA2P ). (3.3)
All consumers in the [0, x̃] interval prefer the Disney movie and all consumers in [x̃, 1] prefer
the movie by Paramount. Then assuming a uniform distribution of consumer tastes, the
demand for Disney is DD = x̃, demand for Paramount is DP = 1− x̃.
In this market, networks often charge different prices to their advertisers, so we allow that
ABC may set a different price per unit of advertising for Disney and Paramount, pD and
pP . Profits for studio j is πj = Dj − pjAj . Maximizing with respect to Aj gives us the
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Comparing equations (3.2) and (3.4), we see that as long as pj > 0, the advertising level is
below utility-maximizing level ASOj . This occurs because ABC sets prices above marginal
costs and charges a higher price to the studio with less elastic demand. With integration
ABC would set prices taking into account Disney’s profits. Let λ track the level of inter-
nalization as in Crawford et al. (2018). Normalizing marginal cost of advertising to zero,
the ABC’s payoff is:








P (pP )). (3.5)


















We see that p∗D is decreasing in λ and p
∗
P is increasing in λ, that is, as the studio and the
network become more integrated, the network charges Disney a lower price and Paramount
faces a higher price. The equilibrium advertising quantity is increasing in the match quality
αj/γj . It is increasing in the level of integration λ for the integrated firm and decreasing
for its competitor.
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Figure 15: Market share of Disney as a function of level of integration λ, v = 1, ūD = 2,ū =
3/2.




D : that is, with full internalization, ABC
sets Disney’s price to marginal cost, eliminating double marginalization. In this market the
efficiency gains imply an increase in advertising for Disney. However, integration also has an
anti-competitive aspect, because ABC has incentives to charge higher prices for Paramount’s
movie. Paramount’s advertising level gets further away from the utility-maximizing level
as λ increases, and eventually goes to zero as advertising becomes prohibitively expensive.
This stylized example suggests that a fully integrated firm forecloses the competing studio
from the television advertising market, which is an important input for the “production of
the final good.”
The empirical analysis investigates how vertical integration affects advertising quantity for
the affiliated studio, e.g. Disney, and its competitors, e.g. Paramount. Looking closely at
A∗j illuminates the key empirical challenge: the need to separately identify the match value
between the movie and the advertising input,
αj
γj
, and the integration effect, λj . In section
?? we discuss our approach, which relies on matching movies to other products with similar




as the analyzed movie. The analysis shows that Disney advertises relatively
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more on ABC than on unaffiliated broadcast networks. As a result, we expect that Disney
is gaining competitive advantage through integration. The theoretical example shows that
differences in the access to the advertising market may affect product market competition.
Figure 15 shoes that, in equilibrium, the market share and profit of Disney is increasing in
λ. If integration has inflationary effects on rivals prices for advertising inputs, then market
share and profit of Paramount would be decreasing in λ.
For completeness, we consider the welfare effects of integration. We assumed zero marginal
costs of advertising and all payments between consumers, studios and the network cancel





D − γD(A∗D)2 − x, if x < x̃
v + αA∗ − γ(A∗)2 − (1− x), if x ≥ x̃
(3.10)
For the purposes of this exercise, we leave the persuasive advertising as part of consumer
welfare: advertising in the utility function proxies for the social benefits from seeing a film.
Note that every part of the utility except the distance is common for all consumers. Denote
the following:
u∗j = v + αjA
∗
j − γj(A∗j )2 (3.11)
ūj = v + αjA
SO
j − γj(ASOj )2 (3.12)
which is the homogeneous part of utility in market equilibrium (3.11) and when the adver-
tising is set to a socially optimal level (3.12). Plugging in the expressions (3.2), (3.8) and
(3.9) and doing some algebra, we can show that:








In these expressions, the match value is captured by the maximum utility ūj , which does
not depend on λ. Total welfare is equal to:
W = x̃(u∗D −
x̃
2
) + (1− x̃)(u∗ − (1− x̃)
2
) (3.15)
Plugging in x̃ =
1+u∗D−u
∗
2 and rearranging, we get the following:
W =
(u∗D + 1)
2 + (u∗ + 1)2 − 3
4
(3.16)














((u∗D + 1)(1− λ)(ūD − v)− (u∗ + 1)(ū− v)) (3.17)
which is a continuous function of λ on [0, 1]. It is easy to see that at λ = 1, ∂W∂λ < 0. If
λ = 0, the derivative reduces to (ūD − ū)(1 + 34(ūD + ū) −
v
2 ) > 0 if ūD > ū. This means
that there is a welfare-maximizing level of integration λ∗, which lies in the interior of the
interval [0, 1], neither the full integration or the complete separation are socially optimal.
An example of the relationship between welfare and the level of integration is presented
in Figure 16. The intuition is the following. Increasing λ increases Disney’s advertising
and decreases Paramount’s advertising. When λ is small, the main effect comes from the
fact that ūD > ū, i.e. advertising is shifted from a worse-matched product to a better-
matched one. However, since the utility function is concave in the level of advertising, as λ
increases, the marginal effect of Disney’s advertising diminishes, while the marginal effect
of Paramount’s advertising goes up. When λ gets close to one, an increase in AD leads to
close to zero increase in utility, but a decrease in A has a stronger effect. Therefore, total
welfare starts decreasing in λ for larger values of λ. Note that the implication here is that
vertical integration may lead to welfare loss even if the product of the integrated firm is
better in a vertical sense.
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Figure 16: Welfare as a function of level of integration λ, v = 1, ūD = 2,ū = 3/2.
3.3. Data and Background
The main data source for this chapter is the Rentrak corporation. The dataset covers
a period of 3 years (January 2011 - December 2013) and contains television viewership
data from 13 million households and 29 million cable set-top boxes. The viewership data is
combined with extensive information on the advertisements aired during the show, including
time, position within ad block, ad copy, product, product category, brand, advertiser and
parent company. The total number of advertising spots in the data is more than 58 million,
of which movie advertisements account for 1.36 million.
The primary focus of this project is on the relationships between major movie studios and
broadcast TV networks. We focus on broadcast television specifically as it is far more pop-
ular than cable and attracts a much broader audience, thus more likely to have a significant
effect on downstream competition between the studios. During the sample period, there are
five major Hollywood studios: Universal Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, 20th Century Fox
Pictures, Paramount Pictures and Sony Pictures (formerly known as Columbia Pictures),
all of which are owned by media conglomerates, as described in Table 10. There are 5
national broadcast TV networks: ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC and CW. However, during the
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sample period CW (a joint venture of CBS and Warner Brothers) is a recent creation and
relatively unpopular, compared to the other 4 broadcast networks, so we do not focus on
CW in our analysis. Out of the remaining four broadcasters, 3 are affiliated with a major
movie studio, the only exception being CBS, which was spun off from Viacom in 2006 and
re-merged in 2019.
The focus of our paper are the relationships between NBC and Universal, ABC and Dis-
ney, and FOX and 20th Century. The three affiliated studio-network pairs have different
histories, which potentially imply differing levels of integration, as it may take time for
the conglomerate to adjust the management structure post-merger. The most recent of
the three relationships is NBC-Universal, created in 2004 after Universal was sold to GE,
which then owned NBC. In 2009, it was announced that Comcast was going to purchase a
controlling stake in NBC-Universal. The deal was completed in 2011, after receiving condi-
tional approval from the regulators. The oldest relationship is between 20th Century Fox
and FOX, starting in 1986 at the inception of FOX broadcasting network. Both companies
stayed under control of News Corp from 1986 and until the end of the sample period. ABC
was purchased by Walt Disney Company in 1996.
All major film studios have “sister” minor studios: Focus Features for Universal, Touchstone
for Walt Disney, Fox Searchlight and New Regency for 20th Century Fox. Theoretically,
these studios should be facing the same affiliation effects as the majors. However, there are
reasons to believe that these studios will exhibit a weaker affiliation effect compared to the
major studios. First, these studios are producing more niche films, which are less likely to
make a substantial profit, which reduces incentives for integration. Second, by their nature,
these studios are meant to be “independent” from the more corporate major studios. In the
rest of the paper, we will compare the results for the entire set of movies produced under
the parent company to only the ones produced by the major studio.
We observe 196 movies by affiliated studios in our sample. Table 11 presents the number




























































































































































































































































































































































































































parent action animation/family comedy drama other Total
Comcast Corp 23 6 27 16 6 78
News Corp 15 16 20 19 4 74
Walt Disney Co 11 23 6 3 1 44
Table 11: Number of films in each genre by parent company
are taken from IMDB data. Comcast and News Corp produce substantially more movies
than Disney in the sample period. No studio follows a strict specialization strategy, all
three produce in all genres. Unsurprisingly, Disney specializes in animation and family
films. Comcast/Universal concentrates on action and comedy, News Corp/20th Century
Fox focuses on dramas. This suggests that average movies by these studios are different
from each other and therefore likely to advertise differently, independent of their affiliations.
3.4. Analysis
We start by establishing whether affiliated studios do in fact place more advertising on
affiliated broadcast networks. To account for differences in rating and ad duration, we con-
struct ad exposure variable by multiplying the number of households watching a given show
during which the ad airs by the duration of ad spot in seconds. In other words, advertising
is measured in household seconds. It is important to take ratings and duration into account,
as opposed to the raw number of ads because studios typically pay per thousand viewers
on the basis of ad duration.
Given the advertising exposure, we can find the shares of each network in each parent
company’s movie advertising portfolio. Table 12 presents the results. We can see that ABC
is the top network for Disney and NBC is the top network for Comcast. FOX is not the top
network for News Corp, however, FOX is relatively unpopular with movie studios in general
and News Corp advertises on FOX disproportionately more than others. We can use the two
unaffiliated studios, Time Warner and Sony, as a control group and compare the observed
advertising allocation between affiliated and unaffiliated networks. If we use Warner as a
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ABC NBC FOX CBS All broadcast
Walt Disney Co 13.3% 11.3% 3.9% 6.5% 35.0%
Comcast Corp 7.7% 9.9% 4.0% 6.8% 28.4%
News Corp 9.4% 6.6% 6.3% 6.0% 28.3%
Time Warner Inc 12.6% 11.6% 7.9% 12.0% 44.1%
Sony Corp 7.0% 8.5% 5.2% 5.6% 26.3%
Table 12: Major studios’ TV advertising allocation, affiliated studio-network pairs in bold.
control, only ABC-Disney relationship has a positive effect (13.3% vs 12.6%), since Warner
allocates more advertising to NBC and FOX than Comcast and News Corp respectively.
However, Warner’s advertising mix is more skewed towards broadcast television than any
other studio. If we use Sony(Columbia) as a control group, all effects are positive. We get
mixed results from this simple version of the analysis. It underscores that the choice of
correct control group is crucial.
To perform our analysis more formally with a larger set of controls, we disaggregate to the
level of individual movies. In the next section, we discuss the selection of the control group
for each movie. Suppose that there is a number of control products that have the same
advertising strategy as the focal movie, but are unaffiliated from the broadcast network of
interest. For each of these products i, we compute the share of the focal network in their
advertising allocation, across both the broadcast and cable TV channels. Then for each
network (i.e., ABC, NBC, FOX), we run the following regression:
si = δ + β ×AffiliatedStudioi + εi (3.18)
where AffiliatedStudioi as a dummy for movie by the studio affiliated with the given
network, si is the share of TV advertising allocated to the given network by movie i. This
is essentially the same as comparing the average share of, say, ABC, among the control
products to the average share of ABC among Disney movies. If β > 0, this indicates that
Disney advertises on ABC disproportionately.
Note that the specification (3.18) does not take into account the differences in how much
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different studios allocate towards broadcast advertising (like Warner vs Sony), which may
lead to spurious effects. To overcome that problem, we use the allocation to other networks
as a control and estimate a Difference-in-Differences specification, where i again indexes the
products and j indexes the networks:
sij = δ + β1AffiliatedNetworkj + β2AffiliatedStudioi + β3AffiliatedStudioi ×AffiliatedNetworkj + εij
(3.19)
We estimate two versions of (3.19): (i) taking all non-focal broadcasters as a control and
(ii) taking only CBS, as the non-affiliated network, as a control. In this specification, we
(i) take the difference between the share of ABC and CBS (or average across NBC, FOX
and CBS) for the control products and the Disney movies; and (ii) compare the average
difference Disney to the average difference for control movies to find the effect of interest,
which is captured by β3. In this case, we allow for some movies to have a higher overall
level of advertising on broadcast, which is differenced out.
Connecting these regressions to our theory model, Table 12 documents the difference be-
tween A∗D and A
∗
TW . However, it may stem from both λ > 0 and ūD > ūTW . We use
matching to select products that have ūi u ūD. Then if for those products A∗i < A∗D, we
can conclude that λ > 0.
3.4.1. Matching Methodology
For each movie produced by Comcast, Walt Disney Co or News Corp (i.e. including the
major and the minor studios listed in Table 10), we select 20 products that are likely to
have the most similar advertising strategy to the movie.
For the matching procedure, we use advertising data for cable networks that are not affiliated
with either Comcast, Walt Disney or News Corp. There are 50 such networks in our data.
They account for 46.6% of all TV advertising during the sample period. Table 13 lists the
20 most popular networks out of the set of 50. The table lists the share of all advertising and
the share of all movie advertising within the set of unaffiliated networks. It also shows the
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standard deviation of each network’s advertising share across all products and all movies.
Movies do not necessarily follow other products’ advertising allocation. The variation in
shares across movies is much higher than across other products. This can be explained by
the fact that movies in particular are a very heterogeneous category and different movies
can target very different audiences and therefore advertise on different channels.
We can see from descriptions provided that the set of channels is quite diverse, so we can
expect the selection of where to allocate advertising across these channels to be informative.
We also want to see if this diversity is reflected in advertising data. For each channel, we
find the most characteristic advertiser category and film. We define this in the following
way. First, we compute how much advertising each product category accounts for across all
50 selected networks. Second, we do the same within each network. Then for each network
we find the category which has the highest difference between average share of advertising
and their share of advertising within that network. The idea is that product categories, as
well as movies, differ widely in how much they advertise overall, so if we just look at the
top advertisers, for almost any channel they are going to be cars, insurance companies or
telecoms; the top advertising movies are going to be blockbusters. It tells us more about
the set of networks to see which products disproportionately advertise on each network.
The results seem to match a priori intuition: toys advertise on Cartoon Network, Home
Improvement on HGTV, pet food on Animal Planet etc.
The matching procedure goes as follows for a movie m:
1. Select the dates during which movie m advertises
2. For each product advertising during this period (including m), compute the advertis-
ing allocation across the set of unaffiliated cable networks



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comcast Disney News Corp All advertising
Category Share Category Share Category Share Category Share
Fast Food 22% Motion Pictures 14% Fast Food 14% Other 12%
Motion Pictures 16% Fast Food 13% Motion Pictures 13% Insurance 7%
Cars 8% Cars 11% Other 11% Cars 5%
Other 6% Other 7% Cars 6% Pharma 4%
Snacks 3% Confectionery 3% Telecom 3% Fast Food 4%
Telecom 3% Telecom 3% OTC meds 3% Home Improvement 4%
Confectionery 3% OTC meds 3% Media 3% Toiletries 4%
Media 2% Media 3% Cereal 2% Motion Pictures 3%
Tablets \ Phones 2% Tablets \ Phones 3% Snacks 2% OTC meds 3%
Gum \ Mints 2% Hair Products 2% Cosmetics 2% Telecom 3%
Toiletries 1% Prepared Dinners 2% Apparel 2% Finance 2%
Casual Dining 1% Home Improvement 2% Prepared Dinners 2% Casual Dining 2%
OTC meds 1% Insurance 2% Skin Care 1% Prepared Dinners 2%
Insurance 1% Cleaning Products 2% Beverages 1% Confectionery 2%
Hair Products 1% Tech Stores 2% Confectionery 1% Cereal 2%
Finance 1% Cereal 2% Hair Products 1% Discount Stores 2%
Travel 1% Apparel 1% Insurance 1% Credit Cards 1%
Video Games 1% Beer 1% Casual Dining 1% Education 1%
Credit Cards 1% Finance 1% Cleaning Products 1% Cleaning Products 1%
Computers 1% Video Games 1% Gum \ Mints 1% Travel 1%
Table 14: Top 20 categories of products matched to movies by parent company.
4. Select 20 products with the shortest distance from m
We perform step (1) to control for programming availability and variation across networks
over time.
To summarize the results of the matching procedure, we combine all matched product of
movies by parent company (Table 14) and genre (Table 15) and see what share of those
products belong to each of the product categories. First, note that there is a “long tail”
of categories, which implies that there is little overlap in matched products and categories
across movies even by the same studio or within the same genre. Second, the top 4 cat-
egories are always the same: Fast Food, Motion Pictures, Cars and Other. This is not
necessarily driven by ubiquity of advertising by those industries. Table 14 also presents the
top 20 categories by the total amount of TV advertising. It is remarkable how many heav-
ily advertising categories (Insurance, Pharma, Home Improvement, Toiletries) are rarely
matched to movies. Movies very often match with other movies, which suggests that there
is something specific about movie advertising demand.6
6See Appendix for a version of this analysis restricted to only movies as potential control group.
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Action Drama Comedy Animation/family
Category Share Category Share Category Share Category Share
Fast Food 34% Cars 14% Motion Pictures 14% Motion Pictures 14%
Motion Pictures 19% Motion Pictures 10% Fast Food 13% Fast Food 12%
Cars 7% Other 9% Other 10% Other 7%
Other 4% Fast Food 8% Cars 8% Cars 7%
Telecom 3% OTC meds 4% Media 4% Telecom 3%
Confectionery 3% Credit Cards 2% Telecom 3% Confectionery 3%
Media 3% Prepared Dinners 2% OTC meds 3% Cleaning Products 3%
Snacks 3% Cereal 2% Snacks 3% Cereal 3%
Tablets \ Phones 2% Finance 2% Confectionery 2% Apparel 2%
Razors 2% Telecom 2% Tablets \ Phones 2% Tablets \ Phones 2%
Gum \ Mints 1% Travel 2% Credit Cards 2% Prepared Dinners 2%
Hair Products 1% Toiletries 2% Hair Products 2% Media 2%
Insurance 1% Snacks 2% Gum \ Mints 2% OTC meds 2%
Toiletries 1% Insurance 2% Beverages 2% Home Improvement 2%
Casual Dining 1% Confectionery 1% Finance 2% Insurance 2%
Video Games 1% Home Improvement 1% Video Games 1% Hair Products 2%
OTC meds 1% Weight Loss 1% Toiletries 1% Casual Dining 2%
Deodorant men 1% Gum \ Mints 1% Insurance 1% Laundry 1%
Tech Stores 1% Cosmetics 1% Skin Care 1% Snacks 1%
Computers 1% Beverages 1% Cosmetics 1% Skin Care 1%
Table 15: Top 20 categories of matched products by movie genre
3.4.2. Results
We take the matched products identified in the previous subsection and use them to run
regressions (3.18) and (3.19). Tables 16, 17 and 18 present the results for NBC-Universal,
ABC-Disney and FOX-20th Century respectively.
In the first three columns, the sample consists of all movies released by studios owned by the
conglomerate, both major and minor. In columns OLS2 to DID4, we use only major studio
films, i.e. only movies by Universal Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures and 20th Century Fox
Pictures. In columns OLS1 and OLS2, we estimate a model described by equation (3.18),
which ignores the differences in the overall level of broadcast advertising across studios. In
columns DID1 and DID3, we estimate equation (3.19) using shares of all 4 major broadcast
networks as DV. In other words, to estimate the affiliation effect for NBC-Universal, we use
ABC, FOX and CBS as control group for NBC. Note that since ABC and FOX are affiliated
with competing movie studios, they have an incentive to charge Universal high prices for
advertising, which may bias the estimates of the affiliation effect in positive direction. To
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OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBC 0.021*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Universal 0.005 -0.006 0.008 -0.004
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
NBCXUniversal 0.007 0.001 0.013 0.008 0.000 0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Nobs 1617 6468 3234 1176 4704 2352
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.003
Table 16: Regression results for Comcast movies and matched products.
overcome this problem, we use only the unaffiliated CBS as a control group in regressions
DID2 and DID4. The affiliation effect (i.e. the effect of interest) is captured by the studio-
network interaction.
We find no significant affiliation effect for NBC-Universal. This is the most recent relation-
ship out of the ones we study, established only 7 years before the sample period. During
the sample period, NBC-Universal is going through a merger with Comcast, which could
also negatively affect the coordination between different divisions.
We find significant affiliation effects for ABC-Disney and FOX-20th Century. The effects
are directionally stronger for the major studio releases, however the difference is not big
enough to be statistically significant. We find that due to affiliation, Disney movies allocate
between 4.5 and 8.9 percentage points more advertising on ABC and 20th Century movies
allocate between 2 and 6.8 percentage points more towards FOX.
3.4.3. Falsification Exercise
We want to establish that or statistical test of an integrated relationship does not create
a spurios effect. To do that, we perform the same matching exercise and run the same
regressions as in the previous section under the false assumption of affiliation between
unaffiliated studios (Warner Bros, Paramount and Sony) and the three networks we are
interested in. The results are reported in Tables 19, 20 and 21. In case of Warner, we find
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OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
ABC 0.012*** -0.005 0.010*** -0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Disney 0.015** -0.026** 0.010 -0.025**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
ABCXDisney 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.086*** 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.089***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
Nobs 924 3696 1848 798 3192 1596
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj 0.026 0.013 0.014 0.033 0.013 0.017
Table 17: Regression results for Disney movies and matched products.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
FOX -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.031
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
20thCentury 0.012** -0.003 -0.011* -0.025**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
FOXX20thCentury 0.032*** 0.020* 0.035*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.068***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
Nobs 1533 6132 3066 1071 4284 2142
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj 0.014 0.044 0.055 0.024 0.038 0.047
Table 18: Regression results for News Corp movies and matched products.
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OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBCXWarner 0.017* -0.019* -0.007 0.022** -0.017* -0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
ABCXWarner 0.043*** 0.015 0.018 0.045*** 0.014 0.019
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
FOXXWarner 0.042*** 0.014 0.017 0.044*** 0.013 0.018
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Table 19: Falsification exercise: estimated effects from treating Warner Bros as an affiliated
studio.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBCXParamount -0.008 -0.016 0.010 -0.011 -0.019 0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
ABCXParamount 0.004 0.000 0.022 0.003 -0.001 0.021
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
FOXXParamount 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.055*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.057***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Table 20: Falsification exercise: estimated effects from treating Paramount as an affiliated
studio.
significant effects only when we estimate specification (3.18), due to Warner’s strategy to
allocate more of its advertising towards broadcast TV than other studios. When we control
for that, the effect disappears. For Sony (Columbia), none of the “affiliation” effects are
robustly significant. Finally, one can see in Table 20 that we find a significant relationship
between FOX and Paramount, despite them not being affiliated in reality. This is likely to
happen by chance due to the fact that we are testing multiple hypotheses.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBCXColumbia -0.002 -0.015 -0.022 -0.011 -0.009 0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
ABCXColumbia 0.010 0.001 -0.011 0.005 0.012 0.028**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
FOXXColumbia 0.008 -0.001 -0.012 0.012 0.021* 0.035***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)




NBCXUniversal 0.000 -0.005 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
NBCXUniversal:blockbuster 0.047 0.045 0.044
(0.030) (0.031) (0.042)
Nobs 1638 6552 3276
Nparams 2 7 7
R2adj 0.000 0.016 0.005
Table 22: Regression results for Comcast movies and matched products, heterogeneous
effect for 10% most heavily advertising films.
OLS1 DID1 DID2
ABCXDisney 0.062*** 0.044*** 0.086***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018)
ABCXDisney:blockbuster -0.018 0.007 -0.002
(0.037) (0.044) (0.054)
Nobs 924 3696 1848
Nparams 3 7 7
R2adj 0.024 0.015 0.014
Table 23: Regression results for Walt Disney movies and matched products, heterogeneous
effect for 10% most heavily advertising films.
3.4.4. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Another way to test our approach is to consider heterogeneity in treatment effects. If the
effect that we estimate captures only the affiliation between the studio and the network
(λ), then there cannot be any significant heterogeneity in treatment effects across movies
produced by the same studio. We consider two dimensions of movie heterogeneity. First,
we separate the top 10% most highly advertised movies and see if their relationship with
the affiliated network differs from the other 90% of the movies. Tables 22, 23 and 24 show
the estimation results. We find no significant heterogeneity across the board.
Second, we consider genre heterogeneity. Can the affiliation effect be stronger for Disney
animation movies compared to all other Disney movies? For considerations of statistical
power, we limit ourselves to a maximum of two top genres per studio. Those genres are:
comedy and action for Comcast, animation for Disney, comedy and drama for News Corp.
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OLS1 DID1 DID2
FOXX20thCentury 0.029*** 0.015 0.033***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012)
FOXX20thCentury:blockbuster -0.028 0.023 0.000
(0.023) (0.038) (0.043)
Nobs 1617 6468 3234
Nparams 3 7 7
R2adj 0.012 0.045 0.055
Table 24: Regression results for News Corp movies and matched products, heterogeneous
effect for 10% most heavily advertising films.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBCXUniversal -0.002 -0.002 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031)
NBCXUniversal:comedy 0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.002 0.004 -0.012
(0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.040)
NBCXUniversal:action 0.016 0.001 -0.005 0.009 -0.005 -0.010
(0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.029) (0.030) (0.041)
Nobs 1638 6552 3276 1176 4704 2352
Nparams 3 11 11 3 11 11
R2adj -0.001 0.013 0.002 -0.002 0.013 0.000
Table 25: Regression results for Comcast films, with treatment heterogeneity for top two
movie genres produced by the studio: comedy and action.
We find no significant heterogeneity for Comcast (Table 25) and Disney (Table 26) movies.
Surprisingly, we find significant heterogeneity for comedy and drama produced by News
Corp-affiliated studios in the first three columns of Table 27. However, if we focus only
on movies produced by the major studio, 20th Century Fox, the genre heterogeneity is not
significant. We interpret these results in the following way. 20th Century Fox and Fox
Searchlight differ in their level of integration with FOX, specifically Fox Searchlight is more
independent and less coordinated with the rest of the conglomerate. The studios differ
in the genre specialization. Fox Searchlight produces mostly drama and comedy movies,
so the differences between the minor and the major studios are reflected through genre
heterogeneity.
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OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
ABCXDisney 0.077*** 0.058*** 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.090***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025)
ABCXDisney:animation -0.034 -0.026 -0.007 -0.027 -0.043 -0.002
(0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.035)
Nobs 924 3696 1848 798 3192 1596
Nparams 3 7 7 3 7 7
R2adj 0.033 0.015 0.019 0.036 0.013 0.018
Table 26: Regression results for Disney films, with treatment heterogeneity for animation
and family movies.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
FOXX20thCentury 0.046*** 0.062*** 0.076*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.078***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017)
FOXX20thCentury:comedy -0.037** -0.095*** -0.087*** -0.036* -0.049 -0.046
(0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.020) (0.031) (0.035)
FOXX20thCentury:drama -0.024 -0.072*** -0.071** 0.009 -0.022 -0.005
(0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.040) (0.044)
Nobs 1554 6216 3108 1071 4284 2142
Nparams 5 11 11 5 11 11
R2adj 0.018 0.050 0.059 0.039 0.040 0.051
Table 27: Regression results for News Corp films, with treatment heterogeneity for comedy
and drama movies - top two genres produced by the studio.
100
3.5. Conclusion
We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of integration between major film
studios and broadcast television networks. We construct a theoretical model of a duopolistic
movie market, in which studios compete in persuasive advertising levels, which are mediated
through a monopolistic TV network. One of the studios is integrated with the TV network.
We find that increasing integration leads to higher and more optimal level of advertising
and higher market share for the integrated movie studio and lower advertising levels and
market share for the non-integrated studio. From the perspective of total welfare, we find
that there is an optimal level of integration that is between 0 (the studio is independent
from the network) and 1 (the studio and network are fully integrated).
Our theoretical model also shows us that there are two forces that can lead a studio to dis-
proportionately advertise on a given network: (i) content match between the studio’s films
and the network’s programming (i.e. the movies and the shows are serving the same target
audience) and (ii) vertical integration. Our empirical exercise is focused on separating the
two forces and documenting the effect of affiliation on advertising demand. To achieve this
goal, we combine a Difference-in-Differences empirical structure with a matching procedure
to make sure that we select the control group of products that have as close as possible
content match with the treated movie.
We use data from Rentrak Corporation to estimate the affiliation effects. We find signifi-
cant affiliation effects for the relationships between ABC and Disney (between 4.5 and 8.9
percentage points increase in share of ABC) and FOX and News Corp (between 2 and 6.8
percentage points increase in share of FOX). We find no significant effect for NBC-Universal,
however, this relationship is only about 7 years old and is going through another corporate
transformation (acquired by Comcast) during the sample period, so it is not unreasonable
to believe that the desired level of integration for the conglomerate has not been achieved
yet. If we exclude movies by minor studios affiliated with Disney, 20th Century and Uni-
versal from the analysis, the affiliation effects get stronger. It is particularly pronounced for
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20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight, which points to the idea that potentially the major
studio is more integrated with the rest of the conglomerate than the minor.
We perform a series of robustness checks. First, we perform a falsification exercise in which
we follow the same procedure as in our main estimation under the false assumption that
Warner Bros, Paramount or Columbia Pictures are integrated with one of either ABC,
NBC or FOX. Our procedure returns one false positive out of the nine false relationships
we test, making it unlikely that both our findings for ABC-Disney and FOX-News Corp
are false positives. Second, we try to estimate treatment effect heterogeneity across movie
advertising budgets and genres. If we do not control well for content match with our
matching procedure, it is likely there would be significant heterogeneity in affiliation effects,
as different films would have different content match with the affiliated network. We find
no evidence of significant heterogeneity.
The broader implications of our findings go beyond the context of movie or TV advertising
market. The main takeaway is that vertical integration between a platform and a market
participant in a two-sided market can lead to the integrated market seller’s products to be
featured more prominently on the platform, independent of whether that product is the
best match for consumers. This has further implications for competition and welfare. From
competition perspective, the competitor of the vertically integrated firm loses market share.
From welfare perspective, even if the product by the integrated firm is better in a vertical
sense, integration can reduce welfare by squeezing the competitor out of the market.
102
APPENDIX for Chapter 1
A.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Because the profits of sellers 1 and 2 are ex-ante symmetric from the viewpoint of the
platform, the optimal prices will have p∗1 = p
∗
2. The solutions to the first order conditions
on price yield the expressions in the proposition. When setting p = p1 = p2, the expected
profit is concave in price, hence the solution is a unique equilibrium.




∂α = −2(v+ 1− 2α) < 0 because α < 1/2. Integrating over v and using Leibniz’s
integral rule also proves that
∂E(πCPP )
∂α < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
To find the equilibrium prices, the FOC of a seller of type τ is::
2E(v) + q(3− 2α) + 2− 4α
2




Imposing p∗τ = p
C
τ results in the equilibrium prices as the solution. Comparative statics






(5−2α)2 > 0 when E(v) > 4.
The other items result from plugging-in the prices into the profit functions and integrating
over values where necessary.
Proof of Corollary 1.
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Comparing pCL to p
∗, we find that pCL > p
∗ when








q(5− 2α) + (1− 2α)2 + (3− 2α)v
)
For the second item, the platform’s profit πCP is compared to π
CP
P . Because π
C
P is quadratic





gives the solution in the proposition. Finally, because πCP
∣∣
q=0
≤ πCPP , there is a crossover
of profits as described in the proposition.
For the third item, we follow a similar approach to the second item. E(πCP ) is increasing
and quadratic in q and E(πCPP ) is a constant, therefore, to show the existence of a crossing
point, we only need to show that there is a point such that E(πCP ) < E(πCPP ) for some q. We
take the lowest possible value, q = 0. Then the inequality can be reduced to the following:
4(3− 2α)(E(v) + 1− 2α)2
(5− 2α)2
< E(
(v + 1− 2α)2
2
)
Note that (i) 4(3−2α)
(5−2α)2 <
1
2 and (ii) (E(v)+1−2α)
2 < E((v+1−2α)2) by Jensen’s inequality.
For the fourth term, first observe that E(πCPH ) is a linear increasing function of q and E(πCH)
















L ) is decreasing in q faster than E(πCL ). At q = 0 the profits are again
proportional to the platform’s expected profit and therefore there is a crossing point.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Using the expressions for for prices pCL and p
C
H , they depend on v solely through the belief
sellers have about E(v). Hence, given any equilibrium strategy m(v) and corresponding m,
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the unique equilibrium prices are as specified in the text.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We follow the steps from Lemma 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Assume w.l.o.g. that
E(v|m1) < E(v|m2). First, there exists a state ṽ, such that πP (ṽ,m1) = πP (ṽ,m2). This
state is
ṽ =
2(E(v|m1) + E(v|m2))− (1− 2α)2
5− 2α
(A.2)
and the optimal induced expectation in that state for the platform is E∗(ṽ) = E(v|m1)+E(v|m2)2 ∈
(E(v|m1),E(v|m2)).
Second, it follows that E(v|m1) is not induced in equilibrium in any state v > ṽ, as it is
more profitable to induce E(v|m2) and vice versa, E(v|m2) is not induced in any state v < ṽ.
Third, since E(v|m1) is a rational expectation over which states the platform would choose
to induce such expectation, E(v|m1) ≤ ṽ and similarly E(v|m2) ≥ ṽ.
Fourth, we know that E∗(v) 6= v ∀v, then
∣∣∣ṽ − E(v|m1)+E(v|m2)2 ∣∣∣ > ε, which means that
E(v|m2) − E(v|m1) > ε. Since the state space is bounded, this means that there can only
be a finite number of induced expectations.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we prove that price recommendation always gives a higher payoff than competition to






2 = E(v), the condition














which is true by convexity of the function f(x) = x2.
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4(3− 2α)((vk + vk−1)/2 + t(1− 2α))2
(5− 2α)2
< E(















(v + t(1− 2α))2
2
|k)
Note that (i) 4(3−2α)
(5−2α)2 <
1
2 and (ii) (E(v|k) + t(1− 2α))
2 < E((v+ t(1− 2α))2|k) by Jensen’s
inequality. Then the inequality holds. The rest of the proof follows the same steps as the
proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 2.
We first prove that the cheap talk equilibria satisfy the monotonicity criterion that for every
two cheap talk equilibria characterized by vectors of interval boundaries v̂ = (v̂0, v̂1, . . .) and
ṽ = (ṽ0, ṽ1, . . .) with v̂0 = ṽ0 and v̂1 > ṽ1 then v̂i > ṽi for every i ≥ 2.
Let v̂ and ṽ be solutions for the interval boundaries in Equation (1.15). By definition,
v̂0 = ṽ0 = v. Suppose v̂1 > ṽ1 then v̂1 − ṽ1 = v̂2−ṽ23−2α > 0 which results in v̂2 > ṽ2. Now
assume that monotonicity applies for every i < m. Then: v̂m−1 − ṽm−1 = v̂m−ṽm3−2α > 0 and
by the same logic from above, this proves that monotonicity holds by induction.
Using Proposition 3 from Chen et al. (2008), because the equilibria in the game are mono-
tonic, only the unique equilibrium partition with the maximum number of induced actions
satisfies NITS.
Proof of Proposition 4.




5−2α ). If q = q̂,
E(πRH) < E(πCPH ) as the first summands are equal, but the second linear part is larger for
E(πCPH ). As the profit in case of recommendation is quadratic and increasing, the crossing
point has to be further to the right than q̂. Then q̂H > q̂.
106
Second, consider the low type. Again we can write it as a combination of quadratic increas-





By the same logic as before, we get that at q = q̃, E(πRL ) > E(πCPL ). We also know that at
q = 0 E(πRL ) < E(πCPL ). Both functions are monotonic, so it has to be the case that q̂L < q̂.
The proof for the competition regime follows the same steps.
Proof of Proposition 5.
As established in the text, the relationship between the expected total demands is deter-
mined by the expected prices. They are the following:
E(pCP (v)) =















vk + vk−1 + 2(1− 2α)
5− 2α
=
v̄ + v + 2(1− 2α)
5− 2α
Higher expected prices result in lower expected demand. Because 5− 2α > 4, the expected
demand is ordered as specified in the text.
Proof of Proposition 6.
First we need to derive the expressions for expected consumer surplus. Captives purchase
from the seller that they are aware of if and only if their distance from that seller is below
v − pi + qi. The maximum utility a captive buyer can achieve is v − pi + qi. The utility of
captive buyers decreases linearly with distance. Then the total surplus of captive consumers
is an area under a triangle with base 2(v − pi + qi) and height v − pi + qi. Then CScap =
(v − pi + qi)2.
For shoppers, those located at (−M,−1) ∪ (1,M) act as captives (by Assumption A1).
Then their surplus is (v−pi+qi)
2
2 . The shoppers in the interval [−1, 1] choose between the
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two sellers. Denote by x̃ = q1−q2−p1+p22 the location of the shopper indifferent between the
two sellers. Then the consumer surplus of the buyers in [−1, x̃] is a trapezoid with area
(x̃+ 1)2(v+q1−p1)+(x̃+1)2 and for the buyers in [x̃, 1] it is (1− x̃)
2(v+q2−p2)+(1−x̃)
2 . Combining
everything together, we get the following expression for consumer surplus:
CS(p1, p2) = (v + q1 − p1)2 + (v + q2 − p2)2+
+(1− 2α)
(
2(v + q1 − p1)(x̃+ 1) + 2(x̃2 + 1) + 2(v + q2 − p2)(1− x̃)
2
)
Using equilibrium prices, the expected consumer surplus under centralized pricing is:
E(CSCP ) =
E(v2) + q2(5− 2α)− 3 + 8α− 4α2
2
(A.3)








2E((2E(v)− v(5− 2α))2) + (1− 2α)2(3− 2α)E(v)
−37 + 126α− 124α2 + 40α3
)














+2(1− 2α)2(3− 2α)E(v)− 37 + 126α− 124α2 + 40α3
)
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Second, we need to show that E(CSC) > E(CSR). This reduces to





E((2E(v|k)− v(5− 2α))2|k) ⇐⇒




















which is true by concavity of f(x) = −8(2− α)x2.
Finally, we need to show that there exist a q′ such that E(CSC) > E(CSCP ) if and only if
q < q′. Both are quadratic and increasing in q, but E(CSCP ) is increasing faster. Therefore,
when q is large enough, E(CSCP ) > E(CSC). Then we need to show that if q = 0,
E(CSC) > E(CSCP ). The difference between the two expressions is
E(CSC)− E(CSCP ) =
=
(1− 2α)4 + 2(3− 2α)(1− 2α)2(v̄ + v) + (3− 2α)2v̄2 + (4α2 − α− 7)v̄v + (3− 2α)2v2
2(5− 2α)2
> 0
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7.
For this proof, we introduce the expected full revelation revenue, i.e. the revenue the




3(5− 2α)2q2 + 16
(




It follows from Jensen’s inequality that E(πFRP ) ≥ E(πRP ) ≥ E(πCP ).
First, consider the case α = 0. It is possible to show that E(πCPP )|α=0 > E(πFRP )|α=0 given
the parameter restrictions given by Assumption A1. Then if α = 0 centralized pricing is
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the most profitable regime for the platform.
Second, consider the case α = 12 . In this case under recommendation n
∗ goes to infinity.
Note that now since in this case both sellers are effectively monopolists over their segments
of the market, there is no misalignment of incentives between the platform and the sell-
ers. Therefore, when α = 12 , the platform will communicate the realization of v to the
sellers perfectly. In other words, E(πRP )|α= 1
2
= E(πFRP )|α= 1
2
. It is possible to show that
E(πRP )|α= 1
2
> E(πCPP )|α= 1
2
given Assumption A1. Then when α = 12 the most profitable
regime for the platform is price recommendation.
Finally, one can show that E(πCPP )|α=0 > E(πRP )|α= 1
2
given Assumption A1. This means
that in the first stage of the game, the platform will choose α = 0 and then it will choose
to centralize pricing.
A.2. Signaling Model of Buyer Demand
In this section we provide an example of a model that would generate behavior similar to
the one presented in the paper without the assumption that the buyers observe the sellers’
qualities q1 and q2. The key insight is that under competition and recommendation, the
sellers can use prices to signal their quality while under centralized pricing they cannot.
The setup of the model is the same as before, except for two changes. First, the buyers do
not observe q1 and q2 before making purchase decisions. Instead, they form expectations
of quality given the information they observe (i.e., the prices). Second, we assume that
some buyers can become disgruntled when their expectations are not met and ask for (and
receive) a refund with probability γ(E(qi|pi) − qi). The probability of refund is a function
of the difference between the expected and realized quality. We assume that γ(x) = 0 if
x < 0, i.e., no refunds happen after positive surprises. Note that this means that since q is
the highest possible quality level, the high quality type never has to pay out a refund.
If x > 0, i.e., if the surprise is negative, we assume that γ(x) = x2q . Then the probability
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of refund is linear and increasing in the size of the negative surprise. Because γ(2q) = 1,
if buyers believe the seller to be of high quality, but it turns out to be low quality, they
will always get a refund. Suppose buyers believe that a seller setting price p is of high type
with probability β(p). Then E(qi|p) = (2β(p) − 1)q and if qi = −q, γ = β(p). This can be
interpreted as whenever a buyer is fooled into buying from a low quality seller, they will
ask for a refund.
Given this setup, we can find the following:
Proposition 8. Under competition and recommendation there is a separating equilibrium
in which all players’ strategies and payoffs are identical to the ones described in Propositions
2 and 3. This equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion refinement.
Under centralized pricing, in the unique equilibrium all players’ strategies and high type
sellers’ payoffs are identical to Proposition 1 and the low type sellers’ payoffs are divided by
2 and the platform’s expected revenue multiplied by 34 .
Proof. We start with competition. Since the strategies are the same as in Proposition 2, we
only need to describe the buyers’ beliefs to characterize this equilibrium. The beliefs are
the following: β(pCH) = 1 and β(p) = 0 ∀p 6= pCH .
First, we verify that there are no deviations. Suppose the high type deviates. Then it is
believed to by low type with probability 1. In this case and given that the other seller is
playing the equilibrium prices, the best possible deviation is to pCL yielding E(πCL ), which is
less than E(πCH), therefore, there are no profitable deviations for the high type.
Now suppose the low type deviates. If they deviate to pCH , they will earn 0 because of the
buyers’ refunds. If they deviate to any other price, they do not shift the buyers’ beliefs and
we already know by revealed preference that the optimal price under the belief that the
player is low type is pCL , so there are no profitable deviations for low type. This means that
this is in fact an equilibrium.
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Second, we show that this equilibrium survives the Intuitive criterion refinement (Cho and
Kreps, 1987). This refinement says (in terms of our model) that if for a certain price
p, β(p) > 0 (β(p) < 1), then it has to be the case that this price is not equilibrium-
dominated for high (low type). A price is said to be equilibrium-dominated for type τ if
maxβ̃ E(π
dev
τ (p, β̃)) ≤ E(πCτ ). In other words, if a price p is believed to be set with a positive
probability by a type τ seller, it has to be rationalizable in the sense that there exists a
belief β̃(p), for which this price would be a profitable deviation. Since the original Intuitive
Criterion is formulated for a single sender environment, we have to adjust our refinement
to assume that for all conditions the other sender’s equilibrium actions are taken as given.
This is perhaps the most restrictive version of the refinement.
For a high type seller, for any price, the belief that maximizes their expected profit is
β̃(p) = 1. The best price under this belief is pCH . Therefore, for the high type seller, every
p 6= pCH is equilibrium-dominated. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs we described above satisfy
that.
For a low type seller, if there exists a price that is equilibrium-dominated, then it is
equilibrium-dominated for both types and (i) the Intuitive Criterion does not restrict be-
liefs about these prices (ii) these prices are irrelevant to whether an equilibrium exists or
not, since they are not feasible deviations. This means that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
described above satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
Finally, under centralized pricing, since the platform sets the prices without observing q1
and q2 and the sellers take no action, there is no opportunity for signalling. The beliefs are
β(p) = 12 ∀p, since the buyers know that the platform does not know anything about the
sellers’ qualities. This implies that for the low type seller γ = 12 , i.e., half of the sales are
refunded. For the platform, 34 of all sales are refunded. As a multiplier, this adjustment
does not change the optimal pricing of the platform.
Following this model, the results of the paper might change for specific parameter values,
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but will not change qualitatively.
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APPENDIX for Chapter 2
B.1. Demand Validation
B.1.1. Validation procedure details
I start by selecting the markets in which an entry occurs. Unsurprisingly, the markets
which I selected have a higher median number of licenses (6) than the number of licenses
in the markets in the data (5). They also tend to be earlier in the sample period, as later
all licenses are taken up and no more entry can occur. Since some retailers enter in the
middle of the month, their sales may be artificially low. To avoid this problem, I predict the
equilibria in the market for the three months post-entry, excluding the month of entry. To
predict the demand and costs for the entrant, I draw from the set of types of the incumbents
in the given market. I treat the demand and cost types as correlated. Note that even though
the entrant and one of the incumbents in this case are going to have identical demand and
cost types, their behavior will still differ as their locations are different. The procedure is
the following:
1. pick an incumbent retailer rinc
2. assign to the entrant rinc’s demand and cost types
3. solve for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the market
4. repeat steps 1-3 for all incumbent retailers
5. take the average over the equilibrium outcomes (market shares and revenues)
I remove an outlier market in which the entrant sold only 50 grams in its second month and
exited the market.
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individual entrants incumbents market large market
min -1.26 -1.18 -1.26 -1.14 -0.54
5 percentile -0.40 -0.54 -0.38 -0.56 -0.26
median -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01
95 percentile 0.37 0.66 0.35 0.50 0.23
max 1.69 1.69 1.58 0.96 0.56
mean -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
st dev 0.26 0.37 0.25 0.29 0.16
N 2694 264 2430 286 165
Table 28: Summary statistics for the prediction error in prices
B.1.2. Results
On market level, especially for large markets, the model performs reasonably well. It is
particularly encouraging that the mean and the median for both prices and quantities are
close to zero. On individual level, as expected, there is much more variation. For prices,
the error mean and median are close to zero, but the range of values is very wide. (The
model does predict negative prices for some retailers and markets, which needs to be fixed
in the future). In terms of quantity, the individual predictions for entrants are severely
overestimated. Similarly to prices, the model predicts a wide range of values, but market
shares cannot go below zero, so the large errors cannot be matched by small ones.
Consider the histograms of errors in Figures 17 and 18. Note that with the exception of
the quantity error for entrants, the tails of the distributions are quite thin, which we can
also see from large differences between max/min and 95th/5th percentile variables. Price
errors have a much more symmetric distribution (even if I truncated the small number of
negative prices, the distribution would remain quite symmetric and centered around zero).
In figure 19 I plot the market-level errors in quantity and price with the number of firms
in the market. While the mean error does not seem to vary very much with the number
of firms (it is always close to zero), the variation in the outcomes decreases dramatically in
the number of firms.
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(a) Quantities, all retailers (b) Prices, all reatilers
(c) Quantities, entrants (d) Prices, entrants
(e) Quantities, incumbents (f) Prices, incumbents
Figure 17: Distribution of prediction errors for individual retailers
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(a) Quantities (b) Prices
Figure 18: Distribution of prediction errors on market level
(a) Quantities (b) Prices
Figure 19: Market-level prediction errors vs number of firms in the market
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Figure 20: Error in quantity for the entrant vs the number of firms in the market
There could be two reasons why there is less dispersion in errors for larger markets. First,
since there are more incumbent retailers, the large error coming from the entrant matters
less. Second, the predictions for the entrants might be better in larger markets, as I take
more type draws. In figure 20 I plot how the entrants’ errors in quantities vary with the
number of firms. To the extent that there is any pattern, it looks like the error increases with
the number of firms. This implies that having more draws does not improve the prediction
and the smaller error for large markets stems from having more incumbents.
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APPENDIX for Chapter 3
C.1. Robustness Check: Matching only with movies
One concern is that other products cannot be a good control group for movies, since films
are a very particular product. To address this concern, we perform the matching exercise
and regression analysis using only the set of movies not affiliated with Comcast, Disney
or News Corp as a potential control group. We use the same set of cable networks for
matching. To control for timing, I consider movies released during the same quarter as
the focal movie. I select only 10 matched films for each of the 196 movies of interest, as
there are not as many films as other products. The results are summarized in Tables 29,
30 and 31. For NBC-Universal, the results are the same: no significant affiliation effect.
For ABC-Disney, the estimated affiliation effects are significant,but smaller in magnitude.
For FOX-20th Century, we find no significant affiliation effect if we include Fox Searchlight
movies in the sample. However, if we consider only movies released by 20th Century Fox
Pictures, the affiliation effect is significant, if smaller in magnitude than the one we find in
the main regressions in Table 18. Overall, the main findings of the paper are robust.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
NBC 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Universal -0.010** -0.013** -0.006** -0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
NBCXUniversal -0.002 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.011
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Nobs 858 3432 1716 616 2464 1232
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj -0.001 0.015 0.013 -0.002 0.012 0.014
Table 29: Regression results for Comcast movies, using only other films as the set of possible
matches.
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OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
ABC 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Disney 0.011* -0.012 0.008 -0.011
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
ABCXDisney 0.051*** 0.040*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.067***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Nobs 484 1936 968 418 1672 836
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj 0.040 0.036 0.065 0.047 0.041 0.065
Table 30: Regression results for Walt Disney movies, using only other films as the set of
possible matches.
OLS1 DID1 DID2 OLS2 DID3 DID4
FOX -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
20thCentury 0.005 -0.002 -0.016** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
FOXX20thCentury 0.010* 0.005 0.012 0.023*** 0.039*** 0.047***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Nobs 814 3256 1628 561 2244 1122
Nparams 1 3 3 1 3 3
R2adj 0.002 0.029 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.016
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